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Abstract 
In the midst of the current refugee crisis, the European Parliament is tasked with representing citizens’ 
interests in the European policy-making process. However, the European Parliament’s growing legislative 
influence, and European Union enlargement in 2004, may have fundamentally rearranged the political space of 
asylum and irregular immigration policy. Furthermore, policy-seeking national parties are increasingly 
incentivized to keep their representatives in the European Parliament in check, due to their newfound powers 
and the closeness of the policy area to the core functions of the state. These developments motivate an 
examination of to what extent different national party policy preferences align with the positions that their 
Members of European Parliament take in plenary debates on asylum and irregular immigration. This study used 
the computer-based content analysis method Wordfish to examine 1057 speeches during the 6th and 7th 
periods of the European Parliament (2004-2014), placing Members of European Parliament within a 
unidimensional policy space.  
Wordfish revealed that spoken conflicts over asylum policy predominantly encompass positions for and against 
EU security measures. The ‘left’ in this dimension is more likely to discuss negative aspects of the refugee crisis 
and associated conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, while the ‘right’ is more focused on positive mentions of 
security institutions and cooperation. Further statistical analysis revealed that national parties’ general right-
left partisan preferences are the strongest predictor of this positioning, and Members of European Parliament 
from countries joining the European Union after 2004 are more prone to take pro-security positions. In 
addition, European Parliament party groups were found to play an important role in explaining European 
Parliament preferences, with members of the center-right European Peoples Party taking a significantly more 
pro-security stance. The study highlights that the European Parliament generally faces similar institutional 
constraints when it votes and speaks on asylum and irregular migration. Overall, Wordfish was found to be an 
effective and valid method for examining policy preferences in the European Parliament, confirming the 
growing relevance of computer-based content analysis approaches within political science research. 
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1. Introduction 
European Union (EU) institutions are tasked with providing policy solutions for the current refugee crisis. As the 
only directly elected EU institution, the European Parliament (EP) plays an important role in the legislative 
process, ideally representing citizens’ interests and upholding human rights ambitions. However, Members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs) are often constrained by the interests of their national parties. Therefore, it is 
crucial to investigate the relation between the policy preferences of national parties and the positioning of 
their MEPs within the asylum and irregular immigration policy space.  
Section 1.1 provides an account of the overarching European refugee crisis motivating this study. Section 1.2 
gives a brief explanation of the EP’s rise to power, highlighting the emergence of an intra-institutional struggle 
over ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy, and the balancing act between human rights ideals over security needs. 
Section 1.3 presents the justification for a quantitative assessment of the asylum and irregular immigration 
preferences of MEPs. Section 1.4 expresses the limitations of previous research in this field, based on policy 
preference measurements through roll-call voting. In turn, Section 1.5 motivates the use of computer-based 
automated methods to analyze parliamentary speeches. Finally, Section 1.6 unfolds the research question, 
followed by a roadmap of the study in Section 1.7.  
1.1 Europe’s refugee crisis and the European Parliament 
Europe currently faces the largest refugee crisis since World War II (UNHCR, 2015: 4). The latest data from the 
United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCR) for the first half of 2016 indicates that over 
200,000 migrants have arrived in Europe by sea; 2,500 have gone dead or missing, setting a particularly grim 
record (UNHCR, 2016). Although individual member states are tasked with processing asylum applications, 
legislation relating to asylum and immigration is increasingly being introduced at the European level under the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The European Commission (2016) warns that the CEAS is buckling 
under current migratory pressures, and argues that reform is necessary to ensure effective and humane asylum 
policy.  
Swift and decisive policy-making is crucial for addressing pressing security issues, such as terrorism and the 
current migration crisis. At the same time, Article 6 of the Lisbon Treaty (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
the European Union, 2010) officially made the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights binding for EU 
institutions and member states, creating the need for careful balancing between the security and human rights 
dichotomy. As the only directly elected body of the EU, the EP is ideally the bulwark of citizens, representing 
the interests of the European people within the policy-making process, while traditionally advocating for 
human rights and civil liberties (Servent, 2011: 4). The EP can be held accountable for the decisions they make 
and the legislation they put through. Namely, the European people have the ability to “throw the scoundrels 
out” (Weiler, 1995: 234) via the ballot box, if they disapprove of the EP’s actions. In the past decades, the EP 
has risen from its humble beginnings, gaining increasing influence with each Treaty reform (Servent, 2010: 
191). 
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Recent Eurobarometer polls indicate a growing focus on immigration among the European people, with a 
majority harboring negative feelings towards the issue (Eurobarometer, 2014a: 36). At the same time, 
Euroscepticism is on the rise, with nationalist parties and sentiments gaining ground across Europe 
(Eurobarometer, 2014b: 3). Meanwhile, EU enlargement in 2004 greatly increased the number of MEPs, 
increasing partisan diversity (Scully et al., 2012: 670). In addition, research indicates that European elections 
are merely ‘second-order’ to national elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), with national party interests serving as 
the main determinant of policy positions within the EP (Hix, 2002). Taking into account these issues, and the 
growing power of the EP, it has never been more important to know about the functioning of the EU’s only 
directly elected institution (Scully et al., 2012: 670). In particular, there is need to investigate their specific 
preferences relating to asylum and irregular immigration. How do MEP’s place themselves within this policy 
space, and are they able to independently take positions on such a sensitive issue, or are they constrained by 
institutional factors? 
1.2 With great power comes great responsibility  
The EP was not always a key player in the EU legislative process. Previously, EU-level policy-making relating to 
asylum, and other issues of Justice and Home Affairs, was confined to intergovernmental bargaining. Due to 
the sensitive nature of the underlying issues, some member states were hesitant to give up sovereignty to EU 
institutions, relegating the policy area to a separate non-supranational ‘pillar’ of EU law (Uçarer, 2013: 284), 
alongside the similarly sensitive Common Foreign and Security Policy. With the advent of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1999, an EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) was established, paving the way to 
enhance European integration regarding asylum, police cooperation, the fight against terror, and so forth. This 
process of ‘Europeanization’ has continued steadily ever since, with the Lisbon Treaty eventually abolishing the 
separation of Justice and Home Affairs into a separate EU ‘pillar’. Consolidation of AFSJ has been incremental, 
with the fields of borders, immigration and asylum being the first to shift from the intergovernmental ‘third 
pillar’ to the more supranational ‘first pillar’, in 2004 (Lahav and Messina, 2005: 852). 
Throughout the European integration process, the EP has increasingly gained powers within the AFSJ. Arguably, 
the biggest power gains have been within the legislative sphere (Burns, 2013: 163). Prior to the Single 
European Act in 1987, the EP’s role within the EU legislative process was merely as a consultative body, giving 
advice to the Council of Ministers and European Commission (Häge, 2011: 20). Although the Council was not 
able to adopt legislation initiated by the Commission until the EP had delivered its proposal for amendments, 
the Council was not legally obliged to heed these recommendations. With the Lisbon Treaty’s introduction of 
co-decision as the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP) in 2009, the EP’s equal footing vis-à-vis the Council was 
established as the norm for most policy areas (Burns, 2013: 163). Now, the agreement of both institutions is 
prerequisite for the adoption of new legislation in almost all avenues of the AFSJ. 
Traditionally, the EP has served as a ballast to the security- and control-minded Council in the AFSJ, by 
promoting measures that defend civil liberties (Trauner and Servent, 2015: 13). Under its earlier consultative 
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role, the EP generally positioned itself in opposition to the Council (Trauner and Lavenex, 2015: 231). The EP 
was often critical of EU security policy, with a preference for commitments to human rights and civil liberty 
(Acosta, 2009, Servent, 2010), but some studies indicate that the move to OLP softened the EP’s opposing 
stance (Servent, 2013: 974). Paradoxically, though the EP has gained a strengthened position, the outcome of 
the introduction of co-decision has in some cases been policy stability rather than change (Trauner and 
Lavenex, 2015: 228). Some argue that the EP has broken with its own past policy positions in the search for 
legitimacy (Carrera et al., 2013: 21). 
Other unexpected consequences emerged as a result of the use of co-decision. Notably, a majority of 
legislation passed through OLP is concluded via early ‘trilogue’ agreements negotiated between a handful of EP 
representatives, the Council and European Commission, to expedite the legislative process. However, the use 
of such informal methods can make it extremely difficult to follow the developments of a specific brief, both 
within the EP and especially for outsiders (Farrell and Héritier, 2003: 8). This type of fast-tracking accounted for 
only 28% of decisions between 1999-2004, but rose to 80% in the following Parliamentary term (Schmidt, 2013: 
16). Early agreements within OLP provide the benefit of increased decision-making efficiency (Häge and Naurin, 
2013: 968). But these efficiency wins may be gained at the cost of accountability and transparency (Häge, 2011: 
42).  
With their growing power, the challenge for MEPs lies in balancing between competing claims of efficiency and 
transparency within the legislative process; some research suggests that the pendulum has swung away from 
procedural openness with the advent of OLP (Huber and Shackleton, 2013: 1051). It should be noted that this is 
not necessarily the result of nefarious desires to conduct shady deals outside of the public eye. Rather, though 
injecting more politics into policy-making could improve ‘input’ legitimacy, there are concerns as to whether 
this will compromise the EU’s governing effectiveness in terms of ‘output’ (Schmidt, 2013: 13). Improving the 
EU’s democratic deficit in one regard may have the opportunity cost of reducing democratic legitimacy in 
another dimension (input over output, or vice versa) (Occhipinti, 2014: 102). 
1.3 The European Parliament and the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice 
Studies focused on the newly emerging role of the EP within AFSJ have shown varying tendencies. In some 
cases, the EP has seemingly shifted its policy preferences towards security-related objectives (Acosta, 2009, 
Servent, 2011, Servent and MacKenzie, 2012). Within EU asylum policy, the EP seemingly moved from sharing 
rights-based preferences in line with the UNHCR, to mirroring the security-oriented preferences of the Council 
(Servent and Trauner, 2015: 35). However, other studies find that the EP’s strengthened position within the 
OLP process has led to ‘rights-enhancing’ effects at the national level (Trauner and Servent, 2015: 14). Within 
the area of asylum, this includes lifted refugee protection standards in some member states (El-Enany and 
Thielemann, 2011), with an overall reinforcement of the liberal character of the EU’s asylum system (Kaunert 
and Léonard, 2012). Clearly, the literature shows that there are various dynamics at play within the EP 
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regarding AFSJ matters, especially issues of asylum and immigration, making the topic ripe for further 
investigation. 
While there is extensive research on how the EP behaves in negotiations and influences policy outcomes, less is 
known about the contents of the EP’s preferences, and what it negotiates (Servent, 2013: 972-973). Studies of 
the EP’s policy preferences within AFSJ have mainly focused on qualitative case studies of key pieces of 
legislation, such as the Returns Directive (Acosta, 2009, Servent, 2011, Servent, 2013, Servent and Trauner, 
2015), the Passenger Name Record Agreement (De Hert and Papakonstantinou, 2015) and the Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) Agreement (MacKenzie et al., 2015). Alternatively, 
other studies focus on broader AFSJ sub-areas, such as border policies (Huber, 2015).  
A main underlying question is thus whether the EP has come to prioritize effectiveness over fundamental rights 
when dealing with issues relating to security (Occhipinti, 2014: 102). What is lacking within the literature is a 
larger quantitative overview of MEP’s preferences within this highly salient policy area, with an emphasis on 
issues relating to asylum and irregular immigration. Assigning positions of political actors within a given policy 
space is of key importance to political science research (Hjorth et al., 2015: 1). The use of quantitative methods 
provides the opportunity to supplement the previous small-N studies in this research area, by assessing 
whether the findings within the literature emerge as a pattern when examined at a larger scale. 
1.4 Policy preferences within the European Parliament 
A main challenge is how to go about investigating EP preferences at scale, especially when much of decision-
making takes place outside of public scrutiny, i.e. in trilogues meetings. Publically available roll-call votes are 
one option. Hix and Noury (2007) study MEP immigration preferences expressed through roll-call votes, but the 
analysis is limited to a handful of legislative acts. Furthermore, the aforementioned authors examine AFSJ 
policies during the 5th parliamentary period (1999-2004), before the EP was strengthened with a co-legislative 
role within asylum and immigration policy. Additionally, the study does not take into account EU enlargement 
after 2004, increasing from 15 to 28 member states throughout the decade. As new member states from 
Central and Eastern do not have the same tradition for human rights as in liberal western Europe (Subhan and 
Lavenex, 1999: 2), new conflicts may have arisen in the wake of enlargement. Lopatin (2013) studies the impact 
of co-decision on issues of irregular migration and asylum, finding that the move to co-decision resulted in an 
abrupt shift in voting behavior, and that new member states were more prone to vote in favor of tightened 
immigration.  
Although roll-call votes can shed some light on EP preferences in the context of AFSJ, they may only tell part of 
the story. Generally, voting behavior in parliamentary systems does not reflect ideology due to EU party 
discipline and government agenda-setting (Proksch and Slapin, 2010: 587). How EU party groups strategically 
use roll-call votes may in turn introduce selection bias into research and overestimate inter-party group 
cohesion (Carruba et al., 2006). MEP’s are generally seen as agents with two principals: while their party groups 
play some role in shaping preferences, policy positions of their national parties back home are the dominant 
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factor (Hix 2002: 696). In addition, roll-call votes are seemingly disproportionately used on less meaningful 
resolutions within OLP (Carruba et al. 2006). For example, in some high profile AFSJ cases, such as the EP’s 
rejection of the international SWIFT agreement, the decision was not taken by roll-call (Votewatch, 2011: 16). 
As mentioned previously, trilogues and early agreements have become increasingly common after the 
adoption of OLP. Therefore, roll-call votes provide an incomplete picture of MEP preferences. 
1.5 From language to numbers 
Studying EP plenary speeches offers the potential to circumvent some of the aforementioned problems posed 
by roll-call votes. In public speeches, MEPs can express more nuanced arguments than merely voting ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ to a proposal (Proksch and Slapin, 2010: 589). Furthermore, they are more likely to freely communicate 
their true preferences, removed from partisan and institutional constraints. An additional benefit of 
investigating EP speeches is the fact that they are recorded for a manner of issues which never make it to roll-
call vote. Though participation in legislative debates is one of the most visible activities of MEPs, speech 
behavior remains relatively understudied (Proksch and Slapin, 2012: 520).  
The aim of this study is therefore to examine EP policy preferences expressed through speech, focusing on 
issues of asylum and irregular migration. A key challenge in investigating speech content of the EP is the sheer 
volume of data that needs to be analyzed. Qualitative interpretive methods can only be used on a limited 
number of speeches (barring enormous resources and time), with selective speech analysis introducing 
potential for bias (Klingemann et al., 2006: xvi). Alternatively, there is a growing area of research dedicated to 
computer-based automated content analysis, which allows political scientists to delve into previously untapped 
large-scale text resources (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013).  
Following this new computer-based approach, this study applies the Wordfish scaling technique developed by 
Slapin and Proksch (2008) to quantitatively analyze the entire corpus of MEP speeches on asylum and irregular 
immigration from 2004-2014, covering the 6th and 7th parliamentary periods. By treating words as data, 
Wordfish places MEPs along a political scale within the dimension of asylum and irregular migration, allowing 
for further statistical analysis. Proksch and Slapin (2010) employed a similar approach to examine all MEP 
speeches from 1999-2004, where national party preferences regarding EU integration were found to have the 
strongest relation to MEP positioning. The question is whether this tendency holds true for nationally sensitive 
and hot-button issues such as the current refugee crisis. 
1.6 Research Question 
Research on the EP indicates that national party preferences are the strongest predictor of MEP voting 
behavior (Hix, 2002). But are national party preferences still a strong predictor of the stances that MEPs take in 
their plenary speeches, where they are removed from the institutional constraints of voting? In addition, 
decision-making in the EP is largely dominated by two ideological strains: general left-right and pro/anti-EU 
integration preferences (Ringe, 2005: 732). But do these findings also ring true regarding asylum and irregular 
immigration policy? On one hand, general right-left positioning, expressing an amalgamation of social and 
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economic ideology, could be most important, due to the fact that asylum policies link to the core functions of 
the state, such as the defence of its borders and distribution of wealth. On the other hand, Euroskepticism may 
limit the desirability for European asylum solutions. Furthermore, issue-specific factors such as views on 
immigrants, human rights and social justice may also be influential. EU enlargement in 2004 may also have 
caused new ruptures to emerge within the policy space of the AFSJ. These speculations raise the following 
research question: 
To what extent do different national party preferences align with MEPs’ political positioning in the policy 
space of asylum and irregular immigration? 
This research question investigates the link between the policy preferences of national parties (independent 
variable) and how their MEPs position themselves via plenary speeches regarding asylum and irregular 
immigration (dependent variable). Wordfish analysis is used to measure MEP positioning exclusively within the 
policy area, establishing the dependent variable. The literature indicates that a ‘human rights’ versus ‘security’ 
dichotomy dominates the unidimensional asylum policy space. National party preferences are to be 
understood as the salience of particular issues as expressed in their European election manifestos (henceforth 
Euromanifestos). Salience is measured through the percentage of Euromanifesto quasi-sentences dedicated to 
a given issue, via the Euromanifesto Project (EMP) Database (Braun et al., 2009). The key issues used for this 
investigation include national party views on human rights, immigration, and social justice (combined into an 
asylum index), as well as general right-left partisan preferences, and views for or against EU integration. 
Furthermore, EU enlargement introduced new dynamics into the EP, with the literature highlighting 
fundamental differences in the preferences of parties from old and new member states. The effect of this 
critical juncture is captured through a categorical variable differentiating between EU member states that 
joined before and after 2004. 
1.7 Roadmap of the study  
Chapter 1 introduces the problem area and research question of the study. Chapter 2 unfolds the theoretical 
framework, approaching the object of inquiry (i.e. MEP preferences) from an objective viewpoint. Following Hix 
(2002), MEP’s are characterized as agents with two principals, serving both EU party groups and national 
parties back home, with national parties as the dominant of the two. Chapter 3 provides an account of the 
Wordfish method, which is used to place MEPs within the policy space, based on their plenary speeches 
between 2004-2014. Independent variables concerning national parties’ asylum-specific, general right-left, and 
pro-/anti-EU integration preferences, are operationalized through the EMP dataset, as well as a categorical 
binary variable differentiating between parties from old and new member states. Chapter 4 presents the 
results and validation of the Wordfish analysis, followed by the findings of regression models used to examine 
the relations between the independent and dependent variables. Chapter 5 expands on the findings of the 
previous Chapter, exploring their relation to the wider literature, while bringing up challenges and limitations 
of the chosen methods. Finally, Chapter 6 answers the research question, concluding the study.  
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2. Theory 
The main goal of this Chapter is to establish a theoretical framework for how MEP preferences are formed. 
Section 2.1 considers the underlying philosophy of science aspects, including the use of speech as a proxy for 
latent policy positions, and the conceptualization of political preferences within a unidimensional policy space. 
Section 2.2 narrows down the body of research relating to the EP, bringing forth the importance of national 
parties in shaping MEPs’ preferences. In turn, national parties are depicted as policy-seekers when dealing with 
EU politics, based on the ‘second-order’ nature of EU elections (Section 2.3). Based on Hix (2002), national 
parties are identified as the primary principal of MEPs (Section 2.4). Section 2.5 ties the theory together to 
raise the four hypotheses used to investigate the influence of different national party factors on MEP 
preferences. Finally, Section 2.6 provides a preliminary conclusion summarizing key aspects of this Chapter. 
2.1 Philosophy of science considerations 
As is wont for social science research, the object of inquiry of this study (i.e. MEPs’ policy preferences) is not 
directly measurable (Bakker, 2009: 413). Thus, we must rely on other observable phenomena to serve as an 
indicator of this latent variable. Eschewing the challenges of selection bias linked to parliamentary roll-call 
voting (Carruba et al., 2006), parliamentary speeches will be used as a proxy for MEP preferences. Traditionally, 
content analysis of textual data (including speech) treats text as an object for subjective interpretation. 
Employing a computer-based automated content analysis breaks with this approach, by treating text as 
objective data that reflects information about its author (Benoit et al., 2009: 495). Transforming words into 
data thus allows statistical methods to be applied, in order to make inferences regarding the latent policy 
positions that are impossible to observe (Benoit et al., 2009). This provides the benefit of eliminating bias and 
human error, which can plague more subjective investigations. 
With these considerations in place, we must conceptualize a model of how politicians’ preferences align within 
a given political space. Obviously, the main political actors in the model are MEPs. Wordfish creates a 
unidimensional map of the political space to work with, which in turn gives us a simple ‘right-left’ placement of 
MEPs, expressing their preferences as being closer or further away from each other. We must assume that 
MEPs actually care about the policy in question, and that their preferences are of a Euclidean nature; i.e., they 
have ideal policies and prefer that policy outcomes are closer to, rather than further away from, their ideal 
policies (Crombez and Hix, 2015: 480). With this in mind, an actor’s preferences regarding a given policy issue 
can be assumed to be independent of EU policies on other issues, as utility decreases the further away a policy 
outcome moves from their ideal policy, no matter the policy outcomes in other dimensions, due to the 
germaneness of EU policy-making (Crombez and Hix, 2015: 480). 
Although the assumption that the EP legislative process is unidimensional of nature is a simplification, this 
follows much of the current literature (Klüver and Spoon, 2015: 557). While this type of simplification is 
plausible for a single legislative initiative, where there is likely a unidimensional structure of conflict (Klüver and 
Spoon, 2015: 557), this simplicity runs the risk of becoming muddied when examining an entire policy area. 
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This rings especially true for a sensitive issue such as asylum, which touches upon several issues including 
defence of borders, redistribution, citizenship, and so forth. 
There are two basic approaches to measuring the dimensional structure of a given political space: a priori 
methods whereby the key dimension is specified in advance, and a posteriori methods where the political 
space is established inductively as a result of measurements that have been made (Benoit and Laver, 2012: 
196). The latter approach will be utilized here, in line with the unsupervised outputs of the Wordfish scaling 
method applied. The weakness of this sort of inductive scaling approach is that it often requires subjective 
interpretation to assign meaning to the dimension at hand (Hix et al., 2006: 495). The epistemological 
challenge is that the spaces and positions being examined are in essence impossible to observe, but are rather 
metaphorical constructions that cannot be verified (Benoit and Laver, 2012: 196). These results cannot merely 
be taken at face value; they must be anchored in some sort of validation. The chosen validation approaches are 
identified in Sub-Section 3.2.4 of the methods Chapter. 
2.2 Investigating politics in the European Parliament 
Rather than leaving the meaning of the investigated unidimensional space up to open-ended interpretation, it 
is useful to embark with some assumptions in mind, to help frame our understanding of the constructed policy 
space (Benoit and Laver, 2012: 216). Hix et al. (2003: 193) highlight four clusters of research on the EP: 1) the 
general functioning and development; 2) political behavior and elections; 3) political organization and behavior, 
and; 4) interinstitutional legislative bargaining. This study will focus on the third of these clusters. However, Hix 
et al. (2003: 194-195) focus on studies of roll-call voting for investigating party behavior. Ringe (2005) further 
differentiates between two main strands of research on the EP: 1) studies focused on the structure of the EU’s 
political space; 2) voting behavior and voting patterns. The analysis here will be firmly rooted in the former, 
based on the desire to forego roll-call votes in favor of examining the language used by MEP’s to place them 
within a political space relating to AFSJ.  
The question is, what shapes the utterances of MEP’s when they take the parliamentary floor? Political parties 
play a key role in shaping their members’ preferences. Joining a political party gives better chances of 
becoming elected, as the party generally provides resources and party ‘branding’ which helps communicate 
information regarding policy preferences to the voters (Hix et al., 2009: 822). At the same time, if a political 
party is divided in the parliament, it obfuscates the party’s position to the public, creating potential negative 
electoral consequences, thus incentivizing elected politicians to follow party discipline in their behavior (Hix et 
al., 2009: 822). In turn, parties create stability and predictability within parliamentary politics, creating 
cohesion in terms of both roll-call voting and who is able to propose amendments (Hix et al., 2009: 822). 
Furthermore, parties allow a politician to achieve their policy goals more efficiently, by reducing transaction 
costs, and boiling down the amount of information needed to form a position for each policy item  (Hix et al., 
2009: 823). 
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In an ideal world, political decision-makers would acquire complete information, weigh the alternatives, and 
fully-form their preferences regarding a given policy. In reality, legislators are often relatively uninformed 
about the policies they put into force, due to the sheer number of policy proposals they are tasked with, and 
the mass of information they would need to process to gain complete information (Ringe, 2010: 209-210). 
While latent ideological preferences serve as the basis for decision-making, they are mediated under conditions 
of competing interests, uncertainty, and asymmetric information, and can transform when translated into 
policy preferences (e.g. measured through speech or voting) within the context of a concrete issue (Ringe, 
2010: 210). When non-expert MEPs attempt to make informed choices, they are likely to lean on the positions 
of invested experts with whom they have perceived shared preferences with, on a given policy issue (Ringe, 
2010: 210). Due to a non-expert’s lack of complete information regarding their expert colleague’s latent 
ideological preferences, they often rely solely on a proxy for determining shared policy preferences: common 
party affiliation (Ringe, 2010: 210-211).  
2.3 The rationality of national parties 
A key underlying assumption is that political parties are rational agents, who can most effectively pursue their 
benefits through elections and related institutions, with relatively sensible expectations regarding future 
payoffs (Strøm, 1990: 566). As such, political parties’ primary objectives are characterized in three behavioral 
ideal-types: 1) vote-seeking, 2) office-seeking, 3) policy-seeking (Strøm, 1990: 566). A purely vote-seeking 
party’s only aim is to maximize electoral support to control government, while office-seeking parties prefer to 
maximize control over political office, i.e. through gaining control of important government portfolios (Strøm, 
1990: 567-568). Policy-seeking parties aim to maximize their impact in terms of policy outcomes, e.g. through 
the use of government coalitions, but can instrumentally employ vote-seeking and office-seeking behavior to 
achieve these outcomes (Strøm, 1990: 569).  
These models are by no means perfect, and each exhibit their fair share of empirical exceptions: major political 
parties have witnessed the desertion of the median voter, minority governments demonstrate that parties 
willingly forego office, and policy-seekers have actively promoted policies that limit the influence of political 
parties (e.g. giving up sovereignty within the AFSJ) (Strøm, 1990: 569-570). In reality, political parties seek a mix 
of the abovementioned goals, which provide a mix of benefits and tradeoffs. For example, office-seeking may 
conflict with vote-maximizing behavior: parties holding office are likely to be under greater scrutiny from their 
constituency than opposition parties, meaning that failing to deliver may hurt their ability to maximize votes in 
the future (Strøm, 1990: 573).  
Models of party preferences are obviously simplifications of the real world, but the virtue of such simplification 
is that it allows us to generate deductive results (Strøm, 1990: 570). Most importantly, they highlight the fact 
that parties have different underlying goals, and motivations, for their behavior. Smaller parties may seek to 
gain credibility, while larger parties may seek to influence actual policy outcomes (Williams and Spoon, 2015: 
178). Here, policy-seeking is of prime interest, as it is one of the only goals that is easily observable, e.g. 
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through voting behavior (Faas, 2003: 847-848) or, in this case, parliamentary speeches. Political parties thus 
aim to maximize their influence on policy-making in order to achieve policy outcomes that are as close to their 
ideal policy as possible (Klüver and Spoon, 2015: 554). Regarding EU policy-making, national parties can be 
assumed to be mainly policy-seeking actors (Klüver and Spoon, 2015: 554) due to the ‘second-order’ nature of 
European elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). 
2.4 Members of European Parliament as agents with two 
principals 
MEPs stand in a precarious position, with most of them belonging to both national parties and European party 
groups. Hix (2002) characterizes MEPs as agents responsible to two different ‘principals’, i.e. national parties, 
and party groups within the EP itself. EP party groups can exhibit high ideological diversity, meaning that an 
MEP’s national party’s position can diverge from that of their party group on a given issue (Klüver and Spoon, 
2015: 555). Both MEP principals have ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ by which they can reward or punish their agents: 
national parties control candidate selection within EP elections and thus impact re-election chances, while EP 
party groups control committee assignments, plenary speaking time, and so forth (Klüver and Spoon, 2015: 
555).  
As highlighted in the introduction, decision-making regarding asylum policy is no longer an exclusively 
intergovernmental ‘third pillar’ affair; it is now being increasingly decided by EU institutions. Additionally, the 
EP has gained more and more power with each Treaty reform. Within the asylum policy area, the EP went from 
passive consultant to an active co-legislator in 2004. Due to this upward shift in power, there is a strong 
incentive for policy-seeking national parties to attempt to influence EU-level decision-making through their 
MEPs (Klüver and Spoon, 2015: 554). Hence, it will be assumed that national parties actively attempt to achieve 
this influence, to achieve outcomes as close as possible to their preferred policy position (Klüver and Spoon, 
2015: 554). Some scholars argue that national parties thus serve as the primary principals of MEPs, by 
controlling the selection of candidates, deciding which party group their MEPs belong to, and determining 
which MEPs will have the chance to gain key committee positions (Hix et al., 2006: 495-496). Theoretically, 
national parties should have the most influence, as initial candidate control determines whether a career in the 
EP is at all feasible. This is backed up empirically as well: when push comes to shove, MEPs are seemingly first 
and foremost agents of their national parties (Hix, 2002, Klüver and Spoon, 2015). Thus, it can be assumed that 
national party positions are an important aspect to relate to MEP preferences relating to asylum policy, 
especially as it encroaches upon the core functions of the state. 
2.5 National party factors influencing the European Parliament 
Following other studies of the EP (Hix and Noury, 2007, Proksch and Slapin, 2010), it is crucial to examine which 
national preferences are dominant in this specific policy area. Like MEP preferences, the preferences of 
national parties are a latent variable, and thus a proxy must be found to serve as an indicator of their value. 
Unlike MEPs, national parties, as a singular entity, cannot vote nor speak. However, their election manifestos 
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convey the importance of different issues, providing an ideal source of policy position estimates (Klüver and 
Spoon, 2015: 556). Rather than directly confronting other parties, parties strategically emphasize certain issues 
while downplaying others (Budge and Farlie, 1983 cited in Klüver and Spoon, 2015: 555). It can thus be posited 
that when national parties emphasize (either positively or negatively) topics relating to asylum, this will reflect 
on the policy preferences of their MEPs. Previous findings suggest that the liberalness of a society, in terms of 
its attitudes towards rights for minorities and solidarity with developing countries, often results in more open 
policies regarding asylum and immigration (Hix and Noury, 2007: 186). This raises the first hypothesis: 
H1. When national parties positively emphasize immigration, human rights, and social justice, their MEPs 
take on a ‘human rights’ position; when national parties negatively emphasize these issues, their MEPs take 
on a ‘security’ position. 
Furthermore, the investigated time period (2004-2014) takes place at a critical turning point within the history 
of the EU: enlargement in 2004, consisting of the addition of predominantly Central and Eastern European 
states. These new member states have in some studies been placed significantly to the right (Scully et al., 2012: 
671), indicating the potential for a shift in the balance of the EP. In addition, Central and Eastern European 
states have less of a tradition for upholding human rights, compared to the older liberal EU member states 
(Subhan and Lavenex, 1999). Due to these fundamental differences between parties from old and new member 
states within the AFSJ, it can be hypothesized that:  
H2. MEPs representing national parties from new EU member states have a preference for ‘security’ over 
‘human rights’ regarding asylum and irregular immigration policy, compared to old member states. 
In addition to more policy-specific assumptions, the key findings and discussions of studies focused on the 
political space of the EP have hinged on the significance and relationship between two dominant dimensions 
within EU policy-making: 1) the ideological right-left dimension, and 2) the sovereignty/integration dimension 
(Ringe, 2005: 732). The former dimension encapsulates underlying sociopolitical and socioeconomic value 
dimensions, including notions regarding the extent to which the EU should intervene in individual economic, 
social and political relations; the latter expresses a general pro-/anti-EU integration stance (Ringe, 2005: 732).  
How these dimensions reflect on asylum and immigration is of interest here, as it has been argued that as EU 
matters encroach on the area of domestic politics and national sovereignty, the right-left dimension should 
emerge strongly in EU politics (Hix et al., 2006: 495, Ringe, 2005: 732). As the issue of asylum and irregular 
immigration fits this criteria, it can thus be posited that right-left preferences will be dominant. On the other 
hand, past studies indicate that pro-/anti-EU sentiments dominate MEP preferences expressed through speech, 
rather than right-left positioning (Proksch and Slapin, 2010). But whether this has been the case for speech 
content within AFSJ matters remains to be seen. These considerations raise the final two hypotheses: 
H3. National parties’ general right-left policy preferences significantly shape their MEP’s preferences relating 
to asylum and irregular immigration. 
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H4. National parties’ general pro-/anti-EU policy preferences significantly shape their MEP’s preferences 
relating to asylum and irregular immigration.  
2.6 Preliminary conclusion 
This Chapter introduced the theoretical framework of this study, built on assumptions that parliamentary 
speeches provide a proxy for latent policy preferences that are in essence unobservable. Following much of the 
literature on the EP, and the output of the Wordfish method, MEPs are placed in a unidimensional policy space 
based on their plenary utterances. While national parties provide political capital for aspiring MEPs, granting 
incentives for joining a political party, strings are attached: parties have various ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ to steer 
their MEPs to follow the party line. Furthermore, latent political positions are mediated through common party 
affiliation due to incomplete information. As a result, national parties are theorized as being the primary 
principal for MEPs, shaping their policy preferences as expressed through plenary speeches. Due to the 
growing power of the EP, national parties are motivated to act as policy-seekers in this regard, especially when 
EU integration encroaches upon key roles of the state, as in sensitive policy areas such as asylum and irregular 
immigration. Based on this framework, the following Chapter introduces the Wordfish approach used to 
identify the preferences of MEPs, and operationalizes the national party variables that are assumed to 
influence MEP placement within a unidimensional asylum and irregular immigration policy space. 
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3. Methods 
This Chapter outlines the quantitative methods used to investigate the research question at hand, divided into 
four main parts. Section 3.1 provides a general introduction to the wider field of computer-based content 
analysis. Section 3.2 narrows down the aforementioned field, with an explanation of the chosen approach: the 
Wordfish method created by Slapin and Proksch (2008), which is used to measure the dependent variable. 
Section 3.3 operationalizes the independent and control variables, drawing upon data from the EMP Dataset 
and Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Having established independent and dependent variables, Section 3.4 
explains the multivariate regression approach used to investigate the relationship between the two. Finally, 
Section 3.5 summarizes the Chapter in a preliminary conclusion. 
3.1 Computer-based content analysis 
From formal arenas such as the EP’s plenary, to the wild-west of the Twitterverse, much of politics is 
indubitably expressed through words. Though the study of language has long been a cornerstone of political 
science research, the sheer volume of political texts renders the process highly resource- and time-consuming, 
limiting its applicability to all but the most well-funded research projects (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 1). 
Automated content methods “make possible the previously impossible” (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 2), by 
harnessing the growing power of computers to analyze large-scale inventories of text for a fraction of the cost 
and effort of doing so by hand.  
Regrettably, all quantitative models of language are inherently incorrect, as the complexity and subtlety of 
language renders it nigh impossible to understand how the data is generated, which is generally a necessity for 
causal inference (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 3-4). But for text analysis, on the other hand, realistic modelling 
does not necessarily yield better or more productive analyses (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 4). In order to tie 
this productive simplification of language into the real world, it places the burden on the researcher to guide 
the process and evaluate the results, requiring reflection and a deep understanding of the corpus of text 
(Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 4). The output of a given model may be misleading or altogether incorrect, 
requiring the researcher to validate their results, through experimental, substantive and/or statistical means 
(Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 5). Thus, computer-based methods do not replace humans, and provide the best 
results when the abilities of man and machine are carefully orchestrated. 
There is no single best-best approach for conducting computer-based text analysis. Rather, several methods 
are available that serve different purposes. Generally, they can be used to accomplish one of two main tasks: 
classification and scaling (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 2). Classification entails using pre-defined dictionaries to 
assign texts to different categories based on the frequency of keywords, while scaling methods are used to 
estimate actors’ positions within a given policy space (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 2-3). As the current 
research question aims to establish the EP’s policy preferences as dependent variable, scaling methods are the 
most suitable fit.  
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3.2 Unsupervised computer-based content analysis using 
Wordfish 
The benefit of using an unsupervised scaling method like Wordfish is its parsimony, in that it does not require a 
prioi definitions of the dimension being examined (Proksch and Slapin, 2010: 594). Instead, unsupervised 
scaling methods ‘discover’ the words that place actors within a given location in a political spectrum (Grimmer 
and Stewart, 2013: 26). The underlying political preferences of an actor are reflected in the rate by which they 
utter certain words. Wordfish thus applies unique word counts as the primary unit of analysis, comparing 
political texts based on their relative word usages (Proksch and Slapin, 2010: 594). 
Wordfish is based on a number of somewhat heroic assumptions. Firstly, it relies on the assumption that the 
language used in a given text is dominated by ideology (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 3). Secondly, it assumes 
that documents are merely ‘bags of words’, where word order does not meaningfully impact analysis (Grimmer 
and Stewart, 2013: 6). Third, it assumes that word meanings remain stable over time (Slapin and Proksch 2008: 
711). Finally, Slapin and Proksch (2008: 708) developed the Wordfish method based on the notion that word 
frequency is generated by a Poisson process, implying a naive Bayes assumption that the probability of word 
use within a text is independent of the positioning of other words within the text. The Poisson process is 
chosen due to its simplicity, where λ is the only parameter, representing both mean and the variance. The 
functional form of the model is expressed as follows: 
yijt ∼ Poisson (λijt) 
λijt = exp(αit + ψj + βj ∗ ωit) 
Here, the number of times actor i uses the word j at time t is drawn from a Poisson distribution. Furthermore, α 
and ψ are actor- and word-fixed effects, respectively, which serve to prevent overweighing both very long 
documents and very frequently occurring words. The key parameters of interest are β and ω. β indicates the 
weight of each individual word in determining an actor’s position. With the value of the previous parameters 
known, we can isolate and estimate ω, which expresses a given actor’s political position, and thus gives an 
indication of their policy preferences. Having established the values of β and ω, we can thus determine the 
words that differentiate between actors’ positions, and place the actors along a unidimensional scale of 
political conflict. 
Analyzing political preferences with Wordfish involves a four-step process: 1) data collection; 2) data 
preprocessing; 3) applying Wordfish; 4) validation of results. These steps will be unfolded below. 
3.2.1 Wordfish data collection 
The appropriate choice and span of text data is crucial for the Wordfish method to provide usable results. 
Wordfish’s parsimonious nature is both a strength and weakness: though it does not require supervision or 
training, Wordfish naively assumes that the principle dimension that it extracts from texts captures the 
underlying political content (Slapin and Proksch, 2008: 711). But if the fundamental assumption that the corpus 
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of texts is based on political ideology is violated, Wordfish will nevertheless attempt to lay the investigated 
actors out in a different, non-ideological space, presenting a potential pitfall (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 3). 
This means that even if ten different chocolate cake recipes are used as data, Wordfish will brute-force its way 
to place these politically-devoid input texts into a non-existent policy space based on their relative word usage. 
Therefore, in this case, the data must be carefully selected to specifically target texts that have the most 
potential to convey preferences relating to the asylum and irregular immigration policy area, to avoid distorting 
the results by drawing in irrelevant topics. 
Computer-based content analysis for the purpose of identifying political positions has been applied to a range 
of data sources, including EP speeches (Proksch and Slapin, 2010), national party manifestos (Hjorth et al., 
2015, König et al., 2011, Lo et al., 2014, Slapin and Proksch, 2008), interest-group hearing statements (Klüver, 
2009) and even judicial opinions (Dyevre, 2015). Regarding the EP, party manifestos are comprehensive 
documents that are often broad in scope, meaning that asylum and immigration matters may only make up a 
smaller portion of the text and limit their use for a larger quantitative study on such a narrow policy area (Laver 
et al., 2003: 327). In contrast, political speeches are usually more restricted and focused (Laver et al., 2003: 
327). The Wordfish model in essence treats unique words as individual observations, meaning that more words 
translate to better estimations of party positions, and smaller confidence intervals (Slapin and Proksch, 2008: 
711). Legislative speeches and debates in the EP provide a rich source of data: in the 1999-2004 period alone, 
over 50,000 speeches were made on a variety of subjects (Proksch and Slapin, 2010: 595).  
Though EP speeches provide a wealth of data, there is considerable noise that can potentially overshadow the 
results when the focus here is specifically on asylum and irregular immigration. Proksch and Slapin (2010: 592) 
highlight over 2000 different agenda items related to specific policies in the 1999-2004 period, and a 
hodgepodge of procedural issues, question time, and so forth. Painstakingly sifting through all EP speeches to 
identify AFSJ-specific utterances in the 6th and 7th parliamentary periods (2004-2014) would require significant 
resources, necessitating the need to delimit the data selection. As the EP committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs (LIBE) is responsible for handling AFSJ matters, committee members are expected to 
participate in the most important debates within the policy area, providing a shortcut for identifying relevant 
debates. This assumption is based on the fact that committees are the predominant arena for legislative 
negotiations in the EP, where MEPs prepare all substantive legislative choices (Roger and Winzen, 2015: 391). 
Although committees are generally consensus seeking, the LIBE committee is considered to be politically 
charged (Settembri and Neuhold 2009: 138) and therefore its MEPs are expected to actively participate in the 
debate. In addition, the LIBE Committee deals with sensitive issues, and is thus more likely to exacerbate 
political disagreements compared to more technical areas (Servent, 2012: 57). Therefore, the speeches of all 
LIBE members were extracted from the EP Archives (European Parliament, 2014) to identify the most salient 
issues. The policy area of asylum and irregular immigration was chosen due to its predominance in the debate 
and relevance in light of the current refugee crisis.  
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A custom automated text scraping technique, combining the Google Chrome extension Scraper (Google, 2016a) 
with Google Sheets (Google, 2016b) functionality, was developed to expedite the process of acquiring the data. 
First, all members and substitutes of the LIBE committee were identified through the EP Archives. For each 
MEP, the list of total plenary speeches for a given Parliamentary time period was ‘scraped’ for content with 
Scraper, providing web addresses and the subject of each speech. Speeches themselves were obtained using 
the following Google Sheets function, which trawled the xml code of the previously obtained web addresses 
(entered as “URL” in the function) to extract the desired content:  
=CONCATENATE(importxml(“URL”,"//p[@class='contents']")) 
Based on this collection of speeches, hundreds of different topics were obtained, many of which were neither 
AFSJ- nor asylum-relevant. Irrelevant categories were eliminated, leading to a focus of speeches pertaining only 
to asylum and immigration. 
Having identified a number of salient debate topics, this allowed for the extraction of all asylum-relevant 
speeches from all MEPs participating in the debate. Using the URLs obtained from the previous LIBE speech 
scraping procedure, the full corpus of text for a given debate was accessed. Scraper was once again used to 
extract all speeches. Utterances from Council and Commission representatives were removed; additionally, EP 
President speeches were cleansed, due to their procedural nature and low political salience (Proksch and 
Slapin, 2010: 596). Questions directed to the Council and Commission, and explanations of voting were 
eliminated as they consisted of a grab-bag filled with numerous uncategorized speeches and would thus 
require significant resources to parse through for relevance. In addition, a number of speeches in the 7th 
parliamentary period were not translated to English, excluding them from the analysis. Following Proksch and 
Slapin (2010), all speeches from a given MEP were combined to make one ‘document’ for Wordfish analysis. 
While this process gathered speeches from a population of 347 MEPs, there were a substantial amount of 
MEPs who spoke only a few times. This is problematic, as lengthy documents are a prerequisite for Wordfish to 
provide good results, with more documents providing better results (Hjorth et al., 2015: 4). While Proksch and 
Slapin (2010: 597) set a minimum document length of 10,000 words in their large-scale study of MEP speeches, 
this cut-off point eliminated far too many MEPs in this case, as asylum speeches make up only a small portion 
of all topics. Other studies indicate that document lengths above 1000 words are sufficient (Hjorth et al., 2015: 
4), and Slapin and Proksch (Slapin and Proksch, 2008: 721) show diminishing returns in the reduction of 
confidence intervals past this point. Thus, in this case, the threshold for inclusion within the Wordfish analysis 
is set at speeches totaling more than 1000 words. 
To maximize the size of the sample by overcoming the 1000-word threshold, MEP speeches were aggregated at 
the national party level, following Proksch and Slapin (2010: 10). The downside of this approach is that it does 
not take into account intraparty preference variation, and does not allow for the use of personal factors as 
independent variables, e.g. age and gender, which could play a role in preference formation. While some 
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studies have failed to find a significant impact of these personal aspects on voting patterns in immigration and 
asylum policy (Lopatin, 2013: 747) others have found that gender—and to a lesser extent, if an MEP is from an 
ethnic minority—has some impact (Hix and Noury, 2007: 197). On the other hand, aggregating MEPs allowed 
for a larger data set which is crucial for Wordfish to produce high confidence results.  
MEP national party membership was identified through the EP directory (European Parliament, Not Dated B). 
For MEPs who changed national party allegiance under a parliamentary period, party membership was aligned 
with the party in which they served for the longest period of time. As some MEPs served across both 
parliamentary periods but changed parties between elections, speeches were matched to party membership 
for each parliamentary period. 
3.2.2 Wordfish data pre-processing 
Text data must be pre-processed into a format that can be used by Wordfish. More precisely, the complexity of 
the corpus of texts must be reduced, by boiling down words and peeling off syntax, converting them into 
numbers that can be read by the software. For this purpose, the jFreq program (Lowe, 2011) was used to 
convert all words to lowercase, and remove symbols, digits, and ‘stopwords’ (i.e. the most commonly used 
words), as well as to stem words to their most common root (e.g. the words ‘discrimination’, ‘discriminate’, 
and ‘discriminator’ are all reduced to the basic root ‘discrimin’). All MEP and party group names were added to 
the list of stopwords, as initial Wordfish trial runs weighted them highly. This weighting can be assumed to be 
due to the fact that speeches from a given party would be more likely to refer to their colleagues or own party, 
and thus does not contain any politically useful information. On the other hand, non-MEP names (e.g. 
‘Gaddafi’) were kept in as they could contain indication of a political preference. As a result of this pre-
processing procedure, jFreq output a document-term matrix displaying each ‘document’ (consisting of MEP 
speeches aggregated to the national party level) as a vector registering the number of unique word counts. 
After feeding the compiled data into jFreq for pre-processing, further cleansing was necessary before carrying 
out the Wordfish analysis. The word sample must be reduced to avoid words that are used very infrequently or 
by only one party, as these can in theory produce an infinite word weight (Slapin and Proksch, 2009: 7). Ideally, 
words should be used by all parties (Slapin and Proksch, 2008: 713), but under this criteria the resulting 
number of unique words left was well under the threshold of 1000 unique words per document-term matrix. 
Similarly, Proksch and Slapin (2010: 598) drop words used by less than one third of MEPs, but in this case, using 
this threshold resulted in a prohibitively low number of unique words. On the other hand, some Wordfish 
studies only remove words used in one document (Dyevre, 2015: 18, Klüver, 2009: 542), some only words used 
in 15% of documents (Klüver, 2009: 492) while others are not transparent about whether any words are 
removed (Hjorth et al., 2015). In this case, as a compromise, words used by less than 10% of the sample were 
eliminated.   
To test the robustness of the Wordfish results, scores were correlated across different Wordfish computations 
with varying amounts of words removed. Table 1 shows the results of the robustness test, with a baseline of 
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Wordfish analysis where only words occurring in one set of speeches were removed. There was a strong and 
highly significant correlation between the baseline and analyses removing words that occurred in only 10% 
(.959**) and 15% (.859**) of speeches, but removing words occurring in less than 30% of speeches greatly 
lowered correlation and significance (.290*). Removing words used in less than 10% of the ‘documents’ 
provided the highest correlation with the baseline, justifying this choice. 
TABLE 1. ROBUSTNESS OF WORDFISH RESULTS 
Removing words used in % of documents Baseline 10% 15% 30% 
Spearman's rho Correlation Coef. 1.000 .959** .859** .290* 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 .022 
N 62 62 62 62 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Note: Wordfish analyses run without bootstraps 
3.2.3 Applying Wordfish 
After pre-processing, the document-term matrix (see Supplemental Online Appendix A) was fed into the 
Wordfish program, which was run within the statistical program R. To establish 95% confidence intervals, 200 
bootstraps were run. For Wordfish to place policy preferences on a negative-positive scale, two documents 
must be identified which are expected to have differing values of ω, i.e. two different ends of the political 
spectrum (Slapin and Proksch, 2009: 9). The party with the lowest scores in the EMP dataset for the general 
right-left position and EU-integration variables were chosen to represent one extreme, while the party with the 
highest scores in these variables was chosen for the other extreme. An example of the R script used for the 
Wordfish analysis is provided in Appendix 8.1.  
3.2.4 Validation of Wordfish results 
Unlike hand-coding, the computer-based content analysis portion of this study has 100% reliability (Klüver, 
2009: 537), due to the clear and open availability of the data, and complete avoidance of human-error or bias 
within the algorithm's coding process. Furthermore, Wordfish has been shown to be robust to dropping out 
texts (Slapin and Proksch, 2008: 720), limiting the level of bias introduced by the texts that were not included 
due to lack of English translation, and MEPs that were dropped due to too few speeches. However, Wordfish’s 
strong reliability is counterbalanced by the need for extra effort to ensure validity. Due to the unsupervised 
nature of Wordfish, further validation is required to ensure that the preference location output matches the 
intended policy space and concepts claimed (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 28). Namely, validation is needed to 
assess whether or not the results capture the expected ‘rights’ vs. ‘EU security’ dimension as brought forth in 
the AFSJ literature. Furthermore, the parties’ relative placement according to Wordfish along this dimension 
must be validated. To serve these purposes, a two-step validation process was applied. 
First, to confirm that the scaling outputs of Wordfish actually captured a ‘rights’ vs. ‘EU security’ dimension, 
face validation was used as a first step. The word parameters derived from Wordfish were examined to assess 
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whether they follow some general patterns (Slapin and Proksch, 2008: 714). Ideally, we should be able to 
produce an ‘Eiffel Tower of words’ (Slapin and Proksch, 2008: 715), by creating a scatter-plot of the beta and 
phi values obtained in the ‘words’ document created by Wordfish. 
Figure 1 shows the Wordfish ‘Eiffel Tower’ found in this study, which will be explored further within the face 
validation in Section 4.1.2. Selected words indicative of a ‘left’ position in this unidimensional policy space are 
highlighted in red, ‘right’ words in blue, and green indicates politically neutral words with high word-fixed 
effects. The most common words should be placed at the tip of the ‘Eiffel Tower’ due to their high fixed effects, 
with weighting closer to zero as they should be used by parties from across the political spectrum. At the 
opposing feet of the ‘Eiffel Tower’, more politically relevant language should appear, with smaller fixed effects 
accompanied with a negative or positive weight associated with ‘left’ or ‘right’ positions on the spectrum. 
These words must be scrutinized to assess if they are politically relevant and pertain to the policy area at hand 
(Slapin and Proksch, 2008: 716). For example, if a predominance of terms relating to agriculture or sports 
appears within this study of AFSJ matters, it is clear that something has gone awry. 
 
FIGURE 1. WORDFISH ‘EIFFEL TOWER’ FOR ASYLUM 
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Ideally, further measures must be used to test validity. In their study of the EP, Proksch and Slapin (2010) use 
general right-left measures from expert surveys and roll-call voting data to validate their Wordfish findings. 
However, their investigation included EP speeches from all policy areas, while individual policy topics such as 
asylum may produce different preference distributions than mere right-left or pro-/anti-EU sentiments. Thus, 
hand-coding will be used as the second step to assess the validity of the data, as in other Wordfish studies. 
Inspired by Klüver (2009), the coding procedure of the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) was drawn upon, 
to create a classification scheme based on the AFSJ literature and reading the speeches themselves. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the codes used for hand-coding. A total of 14 codes were created for the hand-
coding, consisting of 7 codes classified as ‘pro EU asylum/immigration control’, and seven codes classified as 
‘anti EU asylum/immigration control’. The ‘pro control’ side contained speech fragments promoting EU-wide 
solutions (e.g. burden sharing, readmission procedures), while also shifting blame to member state leaders in 
some cases. ‘Pro control’ speeches also focused on the challenges of managing migratory flows more than 
humanitarian aspects. ‘Anti control’ speeches were more sympathetic to immigrants, with focus on human 
rights and softer asylum policies such as voluntary return. Simultaneously, speech fragments categorized in this 
group were more critical of EU institutions and legislation, as well as their lack of transparency in some cases. 
Furthermore, speeches calling for increased sovereignty and national-level solutions were categorized in this 
group. 
TABLE 2. CODES USED FOR HAND-CODING SPEECHES IN TERMS OF EU ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION CONTROL 
EU asylum/immigration control codes Pro Anti 
EU institutions/legislation positive negative 
Burden sharing positive negative 
Readmission procedure positive negative 
General EU positive negative 
Common asylum system positive negative 
Schengen positive negative 
External borders positive negative 
Asylum/asylum seekers negative positive 
Irregular immigration negative positive 
Human rights negative positive 
Voluntary return negative positive 
Freedom negative positive 
Nations/sovereignty/national borders negative positive 
Transparency negative positive 
Other N/A N/A 
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One speech was randomly chosen from each collection of aggregated national party-level speeches. Each 
speech was hand-coded at the natural sentence level, and assigned into negative or positive positions to each 
of the categories in Table 2 (Klüver 2009: 540). The number of negative sentences was subtracted from the 
number of positive sentences, and then divided by the total number of sentences within the speech. Sentences 
coded as ‘other’ were added to the total number of speeches but were assigned no positive or negative weight. 
This gave an asylum-limited right-left policy space with which the results of the Wordfish analysis could be 
compared. The underlying logic here comes from salience theory, which argues that parties compete with each 
other, and express their preferences by emphasizing certain policy issues rather than through direct opposition 
(Budge and Bara, 2001: 6-7). 
3.3 Operationalization of independent variables 
The independent variables were mainly operationalized through the EMP dataset (3.3.1), including issue-
specific preferences combined through PCA (3.3.2), and general right-left and pro-/anti-EU preferences (3.3.4). 
In addition, a binary variable was created to differentiate between old and new member states (3.3.3). Controls 
for country-level and party group effects were also added to the regression models (3.3.5). An overview of 
independent, dependent, and control variables is provided in Table 3 (See Supplemental Online Appendix B for 
complete dataset).  
3.3.1 Choice of data for independent variables 
The 2009 EMP dataset (Braun et al., 2009) was used to operationalize the independent variables, as the dataset 
provides measures for political preferences of national parties based on issue salience within party manifestos 
(Klüver and Spoon, 2015: 556). This dataset is based on the CMP classification method, with 7 overarching 
policy domains sub-divided into 56 variables. The CMP method consists of human hand-coding of election 
manifestos, which are divided into quasi-sentences expressing political argumentation, and then categorized 
into policy domains (Klüver and Spoon, 2015: 556). Many EMP categories are further divided into ‘negative’ 
and ‘positive’ sub-dimensions, allowing coders to specify whether the tallied quasi-sentences express a 
negative or positive position on a given category. The EMP dataset is based on European election manifestos, 
which are more relevant here, compared to CMP data. Euromanifestos are not limited to national issues, as 
they also express preferences relating to European integration (Klüver and Spoon, 2015: 556).  
Measuring the dependent variable through speeches from 2004 to 2014, while obtaining independent 
variables from EMP data from the 2009 election, presents some challenges. First, the static EMP data does not 
account for changing national party preferences between 2004 and 2014. On the other hand, 2009 is the 
midpoint within the investigated time period, making it an acceptable compromise. Second, the 2009 EMP 
dataset does not contain entries for all parties who gave speeches longer than 1000 words. In some cases, this 
was due to party dissolution between 2004 and 2009 (e.g. several Italian parties); in others, because the parties 
were obscure (i.e. also not present in the 2004 EMP dataset). While the EMP dataset from 2004 could 
potentially fill some of these gaps, this dataset is not entirely compatible: several categories do not match up 
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exactly, making it difficult to combine this data for parties that did not exist in 2009. Parties missing from the 
2009 dataset were thus eliminated from the analysis. In addition, independent MEPs were not included, as 
they do not belong to any national party, making it impossible to operationalize their national party 
preferences. 
TABLE 3. OVERVIEW OF VARIABLES USED IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Type Explanation Hypothesis 
tested 
Indicator Data source Value 
Dependent 
variable 
MEP position on 
asylum-related 
scale, aggregated 
to national party 
level 
N/A Wordfish position 
estimate run with 
200 bootstraps (ω) 
MEP speeches 
on asylum and 
irregular 
immigration 
(2004-2014) 
Continuous.  
 
Range: -2 
(Asylum ‘left’) 
to 2 (asylum 
‘right’) 
Independent 
variable 
National party 
preferences 
specifically 
relating to asylum 
and immigration  
H1 Asylum index, 
established via PCA, 
created from 
summing a 
combination of EMP 
variables for human 
rights, immigration, 
and social justice for 
the underprivileged.  
2009 EMP 
dataset.  
Continuous.  
Range: -100 
(negative 
towards 
asylum and 
immigration) 
to 100 
(positive 
towards 
asylum and 
immigration).  
Independent 
variable 
Whether a 
national party 
joined the EU 
before or after 
2004 
H2 N/A N/A Categorical. 
1: new 
member state 
0: old 
member state 
Independent 
variable 
National party 
general right-left 
positioning 
H3 Sum of right-wing 
codes minus sum of 
left-wing codes in 
national party 
Euromanifesto 
2009 EMP 
dataset 
Continuous.  
Range: -100 
(left) to 100 
(right) 
Independent 
variable 
National party 
general pro-/anti-
EU positioning 
H4 EMP variable 
consisting of sum of 
pro-EU codes minus 
sum of anti-EU codes 
2009 EMP 
dataset 
Continuous.  
Range: -100 
(anti-EU) to 
100 (pro-EU) 
Control 
variable 
EU party group 
membership 
N/A N/A N/A Categorical 
Control 
variable 
Country of origin N/A N/A N/A Categorical 
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Alternatives to the EMP dataset were considered but ultimately rejected. For example, the dataset of Hix et al. 
(2009), which can express right-left positioning and pro-/anti-EU sentiments, using the so-called NOMINATE 
coordinates over these two dimensions. Though versions of the NOMINATE dataset are used in some studies of 
MEP preferences (Hix et al., 2006, Proksch and Slapin, 2010), it presents a few limitations in the context of this 
study. Hix et al. (2009) only covers the EU-15 countries, meaning that the number of cases would be reduced 
from 62 to 53. Furthermore, this would not allow for the investigation of H2, concerning differences in 
preferences between new and old EU member states, to be tested. Hix et al. (2009) uses individual MEP votes, 
where MEPs are aggregated to the national level in this study. While these votes could be averaged, as in 
Proksch and Slapin (2010), there is also a deeper flaw with using votes to predict MEP preferences expressed 
through speech behavior. Namely, it is dubious to claim a causal link stemming from voting behavior to speech 
behavior; rather, the causal arrow should be reversed (Proksch and Slapin, 2010: 15). These theoretical and 
methodological issues strengthen the choice of relying on positions derived from Euromanifestos within the 
EMP dataset. 
The EMP dataset was also chosen over the use of expert surveys, such as the Chapel Hill Survey (Bakker et al., 
2015). While this data has been successfully used in similar studies, it contains one key limitation. Namely, 
expert placements of national parties tend to be highly stable over time (Bakker, 2009: 414). While this could 
be considered a strength rather than a weakness in some cases (Bakker, 2009: 414), this tendency raises the 
potential for a failure to account for changing preferences. Due to the volatility of MEP positions regarding 
asylum after the strengthening of the EP (Lopatin, 2013) the potential ruptures of EU enlargement (Scully et al., 
2012), overall newness of AFSJ matters within the EU, and rising Euroscepticism, data that is robust to change 
is necessary. This again highlights the strength of using the EMP to operationalize the independent variables.  
3.3.2 Operationalizing national party asylum and immigration preferences 
To investigate H1, several variables from the EMP dataset were combined to operationalize national party 
preferences relating to the area of asylum and irregular immigration, consisting of variables from the 
overarching domains of ‘freedom and human rights’, ‘welfare and quality and life’, and ‘fabric of society’. Table 
4 shows the domain, variable, sub-dimensions, EMP code number and definition of these variables. These 
variables capture aspects relating to national party preferences concerning supportive refugee policies, human 
rights, protection of the underprivileged, and generalized feelings towards immigration. All of these categories 
have their respective ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ sub-dimensions. To combine the positive/negative sub-
dimensions into one variable, a proportional scaling approach is applied, consisting of the difference between 
percentages of positive and negative mentions (Klüver and Spoon, 2015: 556). Quite simply, positive scores 
reflect a positive position, while negative scores reflect a negative position. 
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TABLE 4. EMP MEASURES USED FOR OPERATIONALIZATION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES RELATED TO H1  
Domain Variable Sub-
dimension 
Code 
No.  
Definition 
Freedom and 
Human Rights 
Human 
Rights 
Positive 20102 "Favourable mentions of importance of human and 
civil rights; freedom of speech; supportive refugee 
policies." 
Negative 
Welfare and 
Quality of Life 
Social 
Justice 
Positive 70300 "Concept of equality; need for fair treatment of all 
people; special protection for underprivileged; need 
for fair distribution of resources; removal of class 
barriers; end of discrimination such as racial, sexual, 
etc." 
Negative 
Fabric of Society Immigration  Positive 80502 "Need to retain or increase immigration in non-
economic or unspecified terms." 
Negative 
Note: definitions are cited from Braun et al. 2010. 
PCA was employed to avoid overfitting the multivariate regression with too many variables, merging these 
three variables into a single asylum index. Only one factor was extracted from these variables within the PCA 
procedure, following the Kaiser criterion which states that only factors with eigenvalues above 1 should be 
retained. Bartlett’s test of sphericity is highly significant (p < .001), and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure 
of sampling adequacy is .532, slightly above the minimum criterion of .5 (Field, 2013: 685). The factor explained 
52.128% of the total variance. Table 5 shows factor loadings, which were all above the .4 threshold.  
TABLE 5. FACTOR LOADINGS OF THE ASYLUM INDEX IN PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
Variable Factor loadings in PCA 
Immigration .835 
Human rights .675 
Social justice .641 
As is common practice for PCA, values for the immigration, human rights and social justice variables were 
summed to create an asylum index, as these variables were identified as loading on the same factor (Field, 
2013: 705). The factor scores themselves were also tested within the regression model, yielding highly similar 
results to the summed scores in terms of significance and direction of the coefficients. Summed scores were 
chosen to represent the asylum index, due to the fact that they translate directly to percentages of 
Euromanifestos dedicated to asylum and immigration, making the results easier to interpret than when using 
the more abstract factor scores. Since the variables share the same scale (i.e. percentage of quasi-sentences 
per Euromanifesto), there was no need to adjust them to a common denominator.  
3.3.3 Duration of EU membership 
To operationalize H2, a binary variable was created to differentiate between national parties from old (i.e. 
joining EU before 2004) and new member states (i.e. joining EU after 2004). New member states were coded as 
1, and old member states coded as 0.  
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3.3.4 National party right-left and EU integration preferences 
To operationalize H3, general national right-left policy positions were obtained from the EMP’s so-called ‘rile’ 
(i.e., right-left) variable. This measure is constructed within the EMP dataset and consists of the difference 
between the sum of right-wing codes and sum of left-wing codes from a range of different domains and sub-
categories within the EMP (Braun et al., 2009: 56). Similarly, H4 is operationalized through the general Pro-
/Anti-European Integration dimension established within the EMP dataset, also consisting of the difference 
between sums of pro- and anti-EU codes (Braun et al., 2009: 56). 
3.3.5 Control variables 
To control for country-level effects, a dummy variable was created for each member state who’s MEPs 
participated in the debate. A total of 18 countries were represented, including 11 EU-15 countries and 7 new 
member states. No MEPs aggregated to the national party level from Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Luxembourg spoke enough to pass the 1000-word 
threshold necessary for inclusion within Wordfish analysis. Establishing a reference country for this dummy 
variable was difficult, as other studies performing regression analysis on asylum and immigration did not 
specify the reference countries used. Germany was chosen as a reference country due to their consistently 
high number of asylum applicants in the investigated time period (Eurostat, 2016), and status as a Europe-wide 
refugee policy leader according to the UNHCR (Sarmadi, 2014). Germany has since tightened its refugee policy, 
but this did not occur within the investigated time period. 
Party group dummies were also created, consisting of the European People’s Party (EPP) (formerly known as 
European People’s Party--European Democrats (EPP-ED) during the 6th EP), Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats (S&D) (formerly known as Party of European Socialists (PES) during the 6th EP), the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), Greens/European Free Alliance (G/EFA), European United Left-
Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), Non-Inscrits (NI), and Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD). Although 
several other Eurosceptic parties existed during the 6th parliamentary term, they merged into the EFD during 
the 7th term, and will thus all be categorized within this dummy variable following Lopatin (2013). The ALDE 
were chosen as a reference value for the party group dummies, as they have been identified as having the 
most consistent voting patterns on asylum (Lopatin, 2013: 744). F-tests were examined to jointly assess the 
influence of these non-binary dummies (Proksch and Slapin, 2010: 7).  
3.4 Multivariate Regression 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used to measure the relationship between the independent 
variables, consisting of variables relating to national party preferences, and the dependent variable, consisting 
of MEP positions within the political space of asylum.  
Since the regression assumptions of linearity (see Appendix Figure 1, Appendix Figure 2, Appendix Figure 3, 
Appendix Figure 4), homoscedasticity (see Appendix Figure 5), normality of errors (see Appendix Figure 6, 
Appendix Figure 7), independence of errors (Durbin-Watson statistic: 1.873) and collinearity were not violated 
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(variance inflation factor does not exceed 10), OLS regression was used. Cook’s Distance was also used to check 
for particularly influential cases. No cases within the model had values greater than 1 (maximum value: .176), 
indicating that no overly influential cases were present (Field, 2013: 306).  
Six regression models were run: bivariate regression models for each independent variable, a basic multivariate 
model consisting only of the four independent variables, and finally the multivariate model with control 
variables added. The basic multivariate regression model is as follows: 
YMEP = α + β1ASYLUMMEP + β2RIGHTLEFTMEP + β3EUINTEGRATIONMEP + β4EUMEMBERSHIPMEP + ε 
Where Y is the dependent variable, α is a constant, β1 to β4 are regression coefficients, and ε is an error term. 
MEPs, aggregated at the national party level, are indexed by MEP. 
3.5 Preliminary conclusion 
Computer-based content analysis is steadfastly gaining ground within political science research, opening up a 
cornucopia of previously unexplored text resources. Nevertheless, this approach requires thoughtfulness on 
the part of the researcher, to make up for the narrowmindedness of the algorithms used to analyze text. 
Wordfish was the chosen method, due to its efficiency and unsupervised nature. A four-step process measured 
and validated the dependent variable of MEP positioning regarding asylum and irregular immigration. The EMP 
dataset was used to operationalize three independent variables, including asylum-specific, right-left, and pro-
/anti-EU integration preferences. Furthermore, a binary variable differentiated between parties from old and 
new EU member states. OLS regression analysis was used to investigate the relations between independent 
and dependent variables across several models, including controls for country-level and party group effects. 
The results of these methods will be unfolded in the following Chapter. 
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4. Results 
The results of this study are presented in three parts. Section 4.1 accounts for the outcome of the Wordfish 
analysis, which is used to measure the dependent variable, i.e. MEP positioning on asylum and irregular 
immigration as expressed through plenary speeches. MEP positions in this policy space are also considered in 
relation to their EP party groups. Face validation and hand-coding verify the Wordfish results. Section 4.2 
applies OLS regression to investigate the influence of the independent variables, i.e. national party preferences, 
on the dependent variable. Six regression models are run, providing a depiction of differing bivariate and 
multivariate relations, as well as taking into account the influence of control variables. Finally, Section 4.3 
summarizes the most pertinent results in a brief preliminary conclusion. 
4.1 Measuring the dependent variable through Wordfish  
After eliminating speeches from independents and obscure parties, Wordfish was used to analyze a total of 
1057 asylum and irregular immigration related speeches, covering the 6th and 7th parliamentary periods (2004-
2014) (see Supplemental Online Appendix C). Speeches from six parties were removed due to their absence 
from the 2009 EMP dataset. Of the remaining 129 parties, 67 gave few or very short speeches (i.e. under the 
established Wordfish threshold of 1000 words). As a result, 62 parties qualified for the Wordfish analysis (see 
Appendix Table 1 for an overview). While this leaves out almost 100 parties, this sample size is comparable to 
some of the models run by Proksch and Slapin (2010) in their study of EP speeches in all policy areas. Pre-
processing and removing infrequently occurring words resulted in a total of 1874 words left for the analysis 
(see Supplemental Online Appendix A), which is well within the acceptable range for minimizing the size of 
confidence intervals (Proksch and Slapin, 2010, Slapin and Proksch, 2008). 
4.1.1 Wordfish analysis 
Figure 2 presents the Wordfish results, with their 95% confidence intervals (run with 200 parametric 
bootstraps). Descriptive statistics of the variables (Table 6) shed some light on potential bias of the data. Mean 
scores indicate a slight weighting towards positive mentions of human rights, immigrants, and social justice (as 
represented in the asylum index), and a left-bias in terms of general right-left preferences. However, this bias 
may actually reflect the overall construction of the EP, which has been characterized as being dominated by a 
pro-migration coalition of greens, socialists, and liberals (Hix and Noury, 2007: 199). Descriptive statistics of 
party group placements (Table 6) indicate some general trends. As is to be expected, average Wordfish scores 
for the liberal and socialist GUE/NGL, ALDE, and G/EFA are furthest to the ‘left’ within this policy space, with 
the EPP placing furthest to the ‘right’; this follows the findings of Hix and Noury (2007: 192, 197) relating to 
voting patterns on immigration. GUE/NGL places furthest to the ‘left’, despite one outlier placed far to the 
right. Curiously, S&D places dead-center, while they would otherwise be expected to place among the left-
most parties. Figure 2 shows that parties from S&D are spread across the policy space, with the highest 
standard deviation among the major parties (.98). Most unexpectedly, the Eurosceptic and anti-immigration 
EFD parties are also slightly ‘left’ of center. 
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FIGURE 2. WORDFISH RESULTS WITH 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS (200 PARAMETRIC BOOTSTRAPS) 
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TABLE 6. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES AND PARTY GROUPS 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Wordfish Position 62 -1.54 1.89 .0000 0.99419 
Asylum index 62 -14.64 13.84 1.5340 4.06442 
Right-left 62 -33.33 20.18 -6.3653 12.72562 
Pro-/anti-EU 62 -76.00 49.45 2.7161 18.57198 
Old/new members 62 0.00 1.00 0.1774 0.38514 
Party Group N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ALDE 9 -1.49 1.15 -0.63 0.84 
EFD 7 -0.89 1.00 -0.10 0.75 
GUE/NGL 6 -1.54 1.11 -0.69 0.98 
NI 5 -1.52 1.36 0.29 1.24 
PPE 14 -0.26 1.89 0.87 0.68 
S&D 16 -1.47 1.35 -0.02 0.98 
G/EFA 5 -1.22 0.26 -0.54 0.55 
4.1.2 Face validation of Wordfish results 
Examining top word counts for face validity provides an indication of whether or not the Wordfish analysis 
actually captured a politically relevant speech dimension. Table 7 shows the top 24 words that heavily 
discriminated between ‘left’ and ‘right’ extremes, as well as the words with the lowest political salience (note: 
for clarity, ‘left’ and ‘right’ will be used to differentiate between opposite ends of the asylum and irregular 
migration policy space -- this is not to be confused with general right-left positioning across policy areas, i.e. 
the ‘rile’ variable from the EMP dataset). The top non-political words indicate that an asylum and irregular 
immigration dimension has indeed been captured, demonstrated by the frequency of word-stems such as 
‘immigration’, ‘asylum’, ‘rights’, ‘people’, ‘refugee’, ‘illegal’, and ‘border’.  
The top ‘left’ words indicated a focus on the Middle-East and Africa (e.g. ‘Syria’, ‘Iraqi’, ‘Morocco’, ‘Eritrea’, 
‘Somalia’, ‘Sahara’) as well as controversial leaders in the Middle East (e.g. Libya's Gaddafi and Syria’s Al-
Assad). Syria and Somalia are the countries the first and third largest amounts of displaced people, providing 
further validation (UNHCR, 2015: 3). ‘Left’ word-stems also harbor a negative context of war and conflict, 
including ‘kill’, ‘trouble’, ‘weapon’, ‘occupied’ and include words associated with persecution, i.e. ‘religion’ and 
‘ethnic’. These words indicate that MEPs with a ‘left’ position on this scale emphasize war and the refugee 
crisis stemming from the region in their speeches, with a negative connotation. 
In contrast, top ‘right’ words have a more positive framing, such as ‘cohere’, ‘praise’, and ‘faith’, as well as 
words indicative of cooperation, including ‘team’, ‘mutual’, ‘pact’, and ‘network’. Furthermore, top ‘right’ 
words contain direct references to EU institutions such as ‘RABIT’ (Rapid Border Intervention Team), 
‘EURODAC’ (European Dactyloscopy), and the general concept of ‘surveillance’. EURODAC is the EU fingerprint 
database for keeping track of asylum seekers and irregular migrants (European Parliament and the Council, 
2013). RABIT is an EU response mechanism for intervening in urgent situations of mass migration (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2007). ‘Database’ places highly here as well, and further examination of speeches 
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containing this stem indicate a focus on gathering and sharing intelligence relating to asylum seekers. 
Seemingly, the ‘right’ side of this policy dimension is focused on security and EU asylum/border cooperation, 
with a positive connotation.  
Taking all of these aspects into account, it seems that a refugee and irregular immigration dimension has 
indeed been captured by Wordfish, with the ‘left’ concerned with a negative focus on war, humanitarian and 
refugee issues stemming from conflicts in the Middle-East and Africa, while the ‘right’ has a more positive focus 
on security and EU-level interventions in dealing with immigration. However, it should also be noted that a less 
politically relevant linguistic dimension has also been captured here, but to a much lesser extent. These non-
political words are common terms that were not part of the list of stopwords applied in the pre-processing 
stage of the Wordfish analysis. For example, words that at face value do not seem to contain political 
undertones such as ‘underline’, ‘beside’ and ‘latter’ appear in the top 24 ‘right’ words; ‘title’, ‘eventual’ and 
‘wrote’ appear in the top 24 ‘left’ words. 
TABLE 7. TOP 24 WORDS INDICATING A ‘LEFT’, ‘RIGHT’ OR POLITICALLY NEUTRAL POSITION IN ASYLUM POLICY SPACE 
No. Non-political ‘Left’ ‘Right’ No. Non-political ‘Left’ ‘Right’ 
1 European title EURODAC 13 also Jordan team 
2 countries Assad database 14 need eventual cohere 
3 will trouble prerequisite 15 Europe occupied faith 
4 state Somalia praise 16 union religion beside 
5 immigration Lebanon underline 17 refugee Morocco extra 
6 member kill phenomena 18 policies Iraqi pact 
7 asylum weapon latter 19 can Syria emphasize 
8 people our surveillance 20 border ethnic January 
9 Mr. Syrian RABIT 21 us Eritrea vice-president 
10 President wrote employee 22 like utter drama 
11 rights NATO material 23 one Sahara network 
12 must Gaddafi albeit 24 commission Billström mutual 
Note: word-stems are written out for improved clarity. 
4.1.3 Hand-coding validation of Wordfish results 
Wordfish results were cross-validated by comparison with hand-coding, shown in Figure 3. Of the 1057 total 
speeches, one randomly selected speech from each party was hand-coded (6% of total speeches). Hand-coded 
results had a correlation of .775 with Wordfish results (significant at the 0.01 level, applying Spearman’s rho), 
showing a strong relationship between manual and automated methods. This brings credence to the Wordfish 
results and strengthens the following multivariate analysis. 
However, closer reading of some speeches indicated shortcomings within the Wordfish method. For example, 
the MEPs from the Italian North League party were placed to the ‘left’ by Wordfish. When hand-coding, it 
became apparent that although the chosen speech was framed in a human rights context, the speech is in fact 
mocking human rights ambitions: 
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“...the European policy on immigration has a fundamental defect: its single point of departure is a 
concept of defence of human rights, when it is also necessary to think about protecting the rights of 
peoples, their liberty, their safety, and their right not to be invaded. With its do-gooder amendments, 
the left is setting out a non-policy for the return of illegal immigrants…" (Borghezio, 2008). 
While Wordfish seemingly correctly identified human rights-associated words, it did not pick up on the actual 
context of the speech. This confirms one of the general challenges of automated content analysis: the lack of 
semantic sensitivity. By reducing language to a mere ‘bag of words’, Wordfish is not capable of parsing this sort 
of mocking rhetoric, nor discerning positive mentions of human rights from negative mentions. As a result, 
Wordfish faces difficulty when analyzing speeches of the Eurosceptic parties from the EFD, such as North 
League. This may explain their unexpected ‘center-left’ mean position in the Wordfish analysis. Alternatively, it 
could be explained by the lack of focus on EU security institutions due to underlying Euroscepticism. 
 
FIGURE 3. COMPARISON OF WORDFISH AND HAND-CODING FOR VALIDATION 
4.2 Regression analysis 
OLS regression was used to predict MEP positions on asylum and immigration based on associated national 
party preferences. The dependent variable was derived from Wordfish analysis of all MEP speeches on asylum 
and immigration between 2004-2014 (covering the 6th and 7th parliamentary periods). Three independent 
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variables were taken from the EMP dataset, including an asylum index constructed using PCA, as well as 
general right-left and pro/-anti EU positioning; one independent variable was a binary representation of EU-15 
and newer member states. Six regression models were run: bivariate regression (4.2.1) for each independent 
variable (Models 1-4); a simple multivariate regression model (4.2.2) using all independent variables 
simultaneously (Model 5); a more complex multivariate regression model (4.2.3) including dummy variables 
accounting for EU party group and country effects (Model 6). Results from these regression models are 
presented in Table 8.  
TABLE 8. RESULTS OF REGRESSION MODELS M1-M6 
Regression model M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Independent 
variables 
Asylum index -0.031 
(.031) 
   -0.044 
(.036) 
0.030 
(.049) 
Right-left  -0.001 
(.010) 
  -0.005 
(.009) 
-0.025** 
(.012) 
Pro-/anti-EU 
integration 
  0.004 
(.007) 
 0.005 
(.008) 
-0.002 
(.012) 
Old/new 
member 
   1.085*** 
(.255) 
1.041*** 
(.268) 
1.137* 
(.603) 
Control variables Party group      Significant F-change 
Country      Insignificant F-change 
Constant .048 
(.135) 
0.005 
(.143) 
-0.011 
(.128) 
-0.280** 
(.126) 
-0.250 
(.152) 
-.821 
(.600) 
F-statistic 0.995 0.005 0.352 18.094*** 4.835*** 1.945** 
Prob > F .323 .944 .555 .000 .002 .033 
Adj. R2 .000 -.017 -.011 .219 .201 .287 
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 
Note: Standard errors are placed in parentheses 
Significance codes: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
 
4.2.1 Bivariate regression - Models 1-4 
In the first bivariate regression (M1), no significant relationship was found between MEP preferences regarding 
asylum and immigration and their national parties’ scores in the asylum index. Similarly, no significant relation 
was found between the dependent variable and national parties’ general right-left preferences in the second 
bivariate regression (M2). The same was true concerning the third bivariate regression (M3), consisting of the 
dependent variable and national parties’ general pro-/anti-EU integration preferences.  
The fourth bivariate regression (M4), using EU membership before and after EU enlargement in 2004 as a 
dichotomous variable, produced a highly significant regression equation (F(1,61) = 18.094, p < .01) with an R2 of 
.219. For this binary variable, new member states were coded 1, and old member states coded 0. Therefore, 
the positive coefficient (1.085***) indicates that countries joining the EU after 2004 are placed 1.085 to the 
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‘right’ of EU-15 countries, within the asylum and irregular immigration policy space, expressing a deeper 
preference for ‘security’ over ‘human rights’. This confirms with the findings of Scully et al. (2012) who suggest 
that new member states place to the right in terms of general left-right preferences, and Lopatin (2013) who 
found that new member states tend to vote for more restrictive immigration policies. 
4.2.2 Multivariate regression - Model 5 
The first multivariate OLS regression (M5) combines the four independent variables, with no control variables. 
A highly significant regression equation was found (F(4,57) = 4.835, p < .01), with an adjusted R2 of .201. The R2 
value is slightly lower than in M4 due to the increase in independent variables that do not contribute very 
much to improving the model. Running the independent variables together did not alter the nature of the 
results. 
Once again, no significant relationship was found between general right-left positioning in national party 
Euromanifestos and MEP preferences relating to asylum and immigration. This complies with the findings of 
Proksch and Slapin (2010: 608) in their assessment of MEP speeches from all policy areas; they find that 
general partisan right-left positioning is not the best predictor of MEP preferences. Instead, pro-/anti-EU 
preferences are the main factor. However, contrary to the aforementioned authors’ findings, the pro-/anti-EU 
variable is also not significant within this asylum- and illegal immigration-specific policy space. Similarly, no 
significant relation was found between the asylum index and the dependent variable when running the simple 
multivariate analysis 
The binary independent variable differentiating between old and new member states remains highly significant 
when running all independent variables simultaneously. Again, the coefficient (1.041***) indicates that new 
member states place 1.041 to the ‘right’ within this policy dimension compared to old member states, slightly 
less than in the bivariate model (M4). Thus far, this factor continues to be the dominant predictor of the 
placement of MEPs within this policy area.  
4.2.3 Multivariate regression - Model 6  
Model 6 contains all four independent variables, as well as controls for EP party group and country. A 
significant regression equation was found (F(26,35 = 1.945, p <.05), with an adjusted R2 value of .287. Not only 
did including controls improve the model’s ability to account for variance, it also has implications for the 
coefficients and significance of the independent variables.  
In model 6, the coefficient of the asylum index remained insignificant. In addition, the pro-/anti-EU integration 
independent variable remains insignificant in model 6, once again contrary to Proksch and Slapin (2010). 
However, after adding control variables, the independent variable expressing national parties’ general right-left 
preferences in their Euromanifestos became significant after exhibiting no significant relation to the dependent 
variable in the previous models. This indicates that the closeness of asylum and immigration to issues of 
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sovereignty and the core functions of the state, making these preferences overshadow those relating to EU 
integration and human rights.  
The coefficient for general right-left preferences suggests a negative relation (-0.025**), indicating that for 
each 1% of national party Euromanifestos showing general right-wing preferences, their respective MEP’s 
placement within the asylum and immigration policy space will decrease by 0.025. This result deviates from 
what would normally be expected, as it would be assumed that right-wing parties would be more in favor of 
increasing immigration security over human-rights concerns. This assumption is also expressed by Hix and 
Noury (2007) who demonstrate that right-wing parties tend to vote for more restrictive immigration policies. 
However, Proksch and Slapin (2010) also find negative regression coefficients for the right-left variables used in 
their study of MEP speeches. The direction of the coefficient is not addressed by the authors. Another 
explanation could be the nature of the policy space: a ‘right’ position includes preferences for EU security 
measures. Far right, anti-EU parties who are presumably against giving up sovereignty to EU institutions may 
thus be moved more to the ‘left’ in this policy area, focused on discussing the problems associated with conflict 
in the Middle East and Africa rather than European solutions. 
The binary variable for newness of EU membership was again found to be significant, with a positive and 
stronger coefficient (1.137*). As new member states were categorized as 1, this coefficient indicates that new 
member states will place 1.137 points further to the ‘right’ compared to old member states within the asylum 
and immigration policy space. This finding matches Lopatin (2013: 750), who found that MEPs from new 
Member States tended to vote for more restrictive asylum and immigration legislation. Notably, the 
significance for this variable is lower when adding controls, meaning that party group and national effects 
account for some of the previously observed influence of this variable.  
While incorporating EP party group variables alone increased the adjusted R2 value to .406, adding country 
dummies worsened the predictive strength of the model. Examining the F-change of country dummies 
indicated an insignificant contribution, suggesting that common national factors do not have a strong relation 
to their MEP’s preferences. This is surprising, as it could be assumed that shared issues such as the number of 
asylum seekers, GDP, size of the pension burden etc. would influence all parties within a given country. 
However, this finding matches Hix and Noury (2007: 202), who found that political factors played a stronger 
role than member-state specific economic factors. In this case, the significance and strength of the binary 
variable for EU membership indicates that differences between old and new member states are more 
pronounced than general country-level effects. 
Unlike the country-level control variables, the F-change of the EP party group dummies was highly significant, 
indicating that party group factors have a relation MEP preferences; this finding is once again backed up by the 
existing literature on EP immigration preferences (Hix and Noury, 2007, Lopatin, 2013). In addition, examining 
the coefficients of the individual party groups indicated that the EPP group was highly significant (1.379***), 
suggesting that this party scores significantly different than the reference party group, i.e. ALDE. This finding 
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shows that EPP MEPs place 1.379 to the ‘right’ compared to ALDE MEPs. This conforms with Hix and Noury 
(2007: 198-199) who place the EPP group furthest to the right in terms of immigration based on their voting 
behavior. This clustering is also quite evident in Figure 2. Furthermore, EPP gained ground as the dominant 
party within the investigated time period, and has been more eager to take bold moves in putting forth its 
policy stances regarding the AFSJ (Servent, 2010: 203) 
The constant in model 6 was not found to be significant. What is being shown here is that the Y-intercept in the 
model when X is 0 is not significantly different than zero. This makes sense, as a value of zero for the 
dependent variable represents MEPs having a neutral position concerning asylum and immigration, which 
would align with their respective national party also expressing a neutral position in their Euromanifesto.  
4.3 Preliminary conclusion 
Although there was an outlier in each of the ALDE and GUE/NGL groups, Wordfish identified some distinct 
speech clusters within the asylum policy space at the EP party group level. The smaller liberal, green, and 
socialist party groups (ALDE, G/EFA, GUE/NGL) occupied the ‘left’ of the policy space, while the dominant 
center-right EPP party occupied the ‘right’. Curiously, average scores for members of the Eurosceptic EFD were 
slightly center left, while the socialist S&D occupied a nearly dead-center position. Of the two largest party 
groups, S&D MEPs were highly spread across the policy space compared to their competitors in EPP. Face 
validation and hand-coding substantiated the validity of the Wordfish analysis. Face validation indicated that 
the unidimensional policy space captured by Wordfish expresses a ‘left’ concerned with negative aspects of 
conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, while the ‘right’ is more focused on positive associations regarding EU 
security mechanisms such as EURODAC and RABIT, and cooperation in the form of networks, databases and 
pacts. Hand-coding correlated highly and significantly with Wordfish scores, granting further credence to the 
results. 
The regression analysis indicated that MEP preferences regarding asylum and immigration are complex, and 
not dominated by a single factor. Nevertheless, there appeared to be a clear divide between old and new 
member states, with new states placing to the ‘right’, favoring EU security measures. In addition, when adding 
control variables to the model, national right-left preferences were found to have the strongest relation to 
their MEP’s position in the asylum policy space. Surprisingly, right-left preferences had a negative relation to 
party positioning, meaning that left-wing parties had a stronger link to EU security measures, while conflict and 
humanitarian issues associated with the Middle East and Africa were more salient for far right parties. This 
could potentially be explained by these parties’ Euroscepticism and reluctance to give up sovereignty to EU 
institutions regarding security. While country-level controls were not found to be significant, adding the party 
group control improved the predictive power of model. Furthermore, MEPs from the EPP placed significantly to 
the ‘right’ of the policy space, statistically confirming the party group clustering identified within the initial 
Wordfish results. In the following Chapter, these results will be discussed in relation to the wider literature, 
while taking account of limitations and challenges relating to the methods employed in this study. 
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5. Discussion 
This Chapter delves deeper into the implications of the results and limitations of this study. Section 5.1 
provides a discussion of the Wordfish results, with focus on the overall placement of party groups within the 
investigated policy space. This is followed by a consideration of the further challenges and limitations that were 
encountered when gathering data and applying the Wordfish method. Section 5.2. expands upon the results of 
the OLS regression, exploring each hypothesis while taking into account the wider findings of the literature on 
the EP, and asylum and irregular immigration policy. Finally, Section 5.3 provides a brief preliminary conclusion, 
summarizing this Chapter. 
5.1 Wordfish discussion 
Wordfish stood up well to both validation tests. Face validity indicated distinct differences between the ‘left’ 
and ‘right’, depicting an asylum-oriented policy space with a pro-/anti-EU security focus. This is slightly 
different than what was expected based on the literature, as a clear ‘human rights’ coalition did not emerge on 
the ‘left’, showing Wordfish’s strength as an unsupervised automatic content analysis method. Hand-coding 
based on pro-/anti-EU security correlated highly with Wordfish results as well. However, there were some 
limitations. In terms of face validity, non-political words ranked among top scoring ‘right’ and ‘left’ words. 
Using more stringent stopword criteria could circumvent this, but lowering the unique word count may be 
counter-productive to achieving good results with narrow confidence intervals. Furthermore, putting the 
burden of deciding which words are politically charged onto the researcher may inject bias. There may be 
political relevance to the use of some seemingly politically neutral words, requiring substantial a priori 
knowledge on the part of the researcher when establishing stopword criteria. 
Examining the party distributions in Figure 2 and descriptive statistics in Table 6 sheds light on some trends 
within the asylum policy space. As expected, the center-right EPP preferred EU security measures, while most 
liberal and left-wing parties were focused on conflict and humanitarian issues in the Middle East and Africa. 
However, there were also some unexpected findings in terms of how other EP party groups were placed in 
terms of their Wordfish score. Although they are commonly characterized as being a far-right party, EFD parties 
scored slightly center-‘left’ in this case. Generally, EFD parties are a curious case: they are not as concerned 
with traditional right-left issues such as taxes and spending, but rather issues of EU authority (McElroy and 
Benoit, 2012: 163). Combined with a tendency to prefer restrictive asylum policies (Lopatin, 2013: 750), their 
anti-EU and anti-immigration could in effect ‘cancel out’ each other when investigating a policy space that 
concerns EU security measures. Their slightly negative mean Wordfish score (-.10) indicates that anti-EU 
sentiments override preferences for security measures. The fact that EFD parties place to the ‘left’ in terms of 
EU security indicates an interesting split: while they to vote in favor of restrictive EU asylum legislation, their 
speech does reflect this. This could be explained by a greater freedom from institutional constraints compared 
to when MEPs vote, where speaking allows these MEPs to air their true anti-EU integration positions. 
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Alternatively, the public availability of plenary speeches necessitates MEPs from EFD to play to their 
Eurosceptic constituencies when speaking out.  
The strong lack of cohesion among national parties who are members of S&D is initially surprising as well, as 
other studies have characterized them as being highly coherent in their positioning in terms of e.g. right-left 
preferences (McElroy and Benoit, 2012: 162). However, specifically regarding asylum and irregular migration, 
voting patterns indicate the S&D party has shifted from being highly cohesive on pro-migration policy, to a less 
cohesive and more ‘balanced’ positioning after 2004 (Lopatin, 2013: 751). This difference can be attributed to 
the narrow focus on asylum and irregular migration (Lopatin, 2013: 752) This ‘cancelling out’ corresponds well 
with what Wordfish uncovers: mean scores for S&D MEPs is nearly dead center (-.02), with a high standard 
deviation (0.98). The Wordfish findings underline the break in the traditional liberal-conservative dichotomy 
shown in other studies of the EP within this policy area (Lopatin, 2013: 752). This could be a result of increasing 
need for consensus, driven by the increasing powers and ‘output’ responsibility of the EP (Lopatin, 2013: 752). 
S&D’s shift away from other liberal and socialist parties in their speech patterns reflects the changing dynamic 
of the AFSJ, and asylum and irregular immigration policy in particular. Before 2004, prior to the predominantly 
Central and Eastern European enlargement and the ‘communitarization’ of asylum policy, there was a strong 
consensus of pro-migration parties within the EP. Here, after this critical point, the Wordfish analysis depicts 
the S&D party as split in half between security and human rights priorities. Comparatively, the center-right EPP 
stands strongly united in its security preferences, possibly a reflection of its newfound position as the largest 
group, and apparent shift to bolder policy stances (Servent, 2010: 203). The pro-security stance expressed in 
EPP plenary speeches reflects the advocacy coalition that EPP MEPs formed with the Council in this period, 
competing with the previously dominant coalition of center-left groups who advocated for more liberal asylum 
policy (Servent and Trauner, 2014: 1153). Through their plenary speeches, it seems the S&D is attempting to 
‘reach across the middle’, forming an alliance between the two dominant parties to help mature the EP into a 
more ‘responsible’ partner for the Council (Servent, 2010: 203).  
5.1.1 Wordfish challenges 
Seemingly, there are some trade-offs when using Wordfish, between the number of documents included, and 
the length of documents. Failing to include a substantial quantity and length of documents reduces the 
precision of the measurement of MEP positions within the investigated policy space, in terms of the size of the 
confidence intervals. As both the number of documents and their length are important for providing accurate 
results, a balance must be struck between these factors. The need for long documents reduced the number of 
documents available, necessitating the aggregation of MEPs to the national party level, which in turn 
disallowed the investigation of individual-level factors such as gender and ethnicity. Many MEPs were excluded 
from the analysis despite the use of national party aggregation, potentially biasing the analysis against smaller 
parties who speak less. Furthermore, while the Wordfish analysis was robust to removing words used in less 
than 15% of aggregated speeches, correlations dropped off heavily when this criterion was increased to words 
38 
 
used in 30% of speeches. There is an apparent lack of consensus among Wordfish studies in exactly where this 
threshold is to be set, which leaves some flexibility for researchers, but also potential for bias. 
Initially, several areas under AFSJ were combined (asylum, data protection, police and judicial cooperation, 
etc.) but this gave results that did not indicate an identifiable politically relevant dimension when assessed at 
the level of face validity. When using the EP Archives as a data source, there is also some difficulty in 
identifying politically relevant speeches for a given policy area, without spending considerable resources in 
manually scanning them for content. While this is a possibility, it somewhat limits the advantage of the 
automated approach. Though speeches were chosen based on belonging to asylum-related topics, it is possible 
that a number of asylum-relevant speeches were included under other headings. Furthermore, there are 
thousands of uncategorized speeches in the EP Archives under the category of ‘Explanation of votes’ which 
could potentially be politically relevant. These speeches could contain data that would change the positioning 
of the MEPs, meaning that the results may not actually encompass the entire picture. Due to the large number 
of speeches included, this should counteract some of the impact of this limitation. In addition, Wordfish has 
also been found to be robust to dropping out speeches (Slapin and Proksch, 2008). Nevertheless, future studies 
of EP speeches focused on specific policy areas must be cautious of these limitations. Key word searches in the 
EP Archives could be used to extract further relevant speeches, rather than relying on debate topics, but this 
approach may introduce the problem of false positives. 
5.1.2 Text scraping 
The ‘scraping’ method used to collect the data was highly efficient in terms of the quantity retrieved from the 
EP archives, compared to manually extracting speeches. But alas, though it would seem that such an approach 
would provide perfectly reliable results, automated data collection proved not to be infallible. The fact that the 
scraping technique employed here hinges upon the integrity of the code used on the EP Archives is a potential 
weakness. If there are errors in the EP Archives code, these errors will have a negative impact on the reliability 
of the data. This problem occurred in this study, where an early attempt to conduct the Wordfish analysis was 
compromised due to precisely this sort of error. Namely, coding errors in the EP Archive resulted in the 
duplication of 6 speeches; when these duplicates were identified, their removal shifted the placement of 
several national parties within the political space, due to the doubling of unique word usage. This impacted the 
results, rendering the pro-/anti-EU integration variable significant under M5 and M6. Correcting this error 
showed that there was in fact no significant relationship when including controls in M6. Clearly, one must not 
blindly rely on automated scraping methods. Proper vigilance must be employed to make sure that such errors 
do not occur, by manually checking the data gathered and running scripts to check for non-unique data entries. 
5.1.3 Speeches lost in translation 
Another challenge relating to the data gathered from the EP Archives is the availability of translated speeches. 
While all speeches from the 6th EP (2009-2014) were available in English, a large number of speeches from the 
7th EP (2009-2014) were only available in the original language. While Wordfish can be used on languages 
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other than English (Proksch and Slapin, 2010), it would not make much sense to apply the method across 
languages. The dimension captured in such an analysis would almost certainly be pure linguistic, with any 
differences in political preferences being overshadowed due to the absence of common languages. Therefore, 
Wordfish texts used for a given analysis must be written in the same language (Klüver, 2015: 461). As a result of 
this omission, over one hundred speeches were not able to be included in the analysis. Although Wordfish is 
robust to dropping out some words and even some parties (Slapin and Proksch, 2008: 720), it is uncertain what 
effect the omission has in this case. If these speeches were available in English, some parties that were omitted 
due to not passing the 1000-word threshold for the Wordfish analysis may have been included. Speeches being 
‘lost in translation’ may also have imparted some bias into the analysis, by prejudicing MEP’s who choose to 
speak in English over their native language. The EP Archive does not indicate why some speeches are translated 
while others are not. Further translation could be used to overcome this issue, but this would require resources 
beyond what is available for this study.  
5.2. OLS regression discussion 
The regression analysis provided both expected and surprising results, compared to the theory and wider 
literature on EP preferences identified in both speeches and roll-call voting behavior. This Sub-Section relates 
the findings of the regression analysis to the four underlying hypotheses of the study.  
5.2.1 Hypothesis 1 
H1. When national parties positively emphasize immigration, human rights, and social justice, their MEPs 
take on a ‘human rights’ position; when national parties negatively emphasize these issues, their MEPs take 
on a ‘security’ position. 
National party preferences concerning immigration, human rights and social justice (as comprised in the 
asylum index) were not found to have a strong relation with their MEP’s preferences under any of the models. 
Based on the literature, it was assumed that national parties who exhibited positive or negative salience 
concerning these issues would be associated with MEPs taking either a stronger or weaker ‘human rights’ or 
‘security’ position.  
An explanation could relate to the shortcoming of the Wordfish results uncovered within the hand-coding (see 
Section 4.1.3). More precisely, going more in-depth into the speeches during hand-coding suggested that while 
some parties on the ‘left’ spoke of aspects relating to human rights, the context was not necessarily positive. 
This is a key weakness of Wordfish: it cannot parse these semantic differences. This suggests that while parties 
on the ‘left’ are indeed concerned with conflict in the Middle East and Africa, they do not necessarily share a 
common concern for human rights and social justice, nor a positive view on immigration. Similarly, parties on 
the ‘right’ are not necessarily anti-human rights nor anti-immigration. Rather, what the Wordfish analysis 
shows it that these parties prioritize different issues in their speeches. The larger and more mainstream EPP 
and S&D parties were more positively oriented towards EU security measures compared to the smaller ‘left’ 
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parties, while on average being less concerned with discussing the negative aspects of conflicts in the Middle 
East and Africa. 
5.2.2 Hypothesis 2 
H2. MEPs representing national parties from new EU member states have a preference for ‘security’ over 
‘human rights’ regarding asylum and irregular immigration policy, compared to old member states. 
The binary variable differentiating between EU member states that joined before and after 2004 enlargement 
was found to be significant in all models where it was entered (M4-M6), confirming this hypothesis. The 
variable had the largest coefficient, associating it with shifts of MEP preferences far to the ‘right’. While it could 
be assumed that this is due to the new Central and Eastern European states being more right-winged, the 
coefficient for general right-left preferences actually pointed in the opposite direction (M5). However, the fact 
that the policy dimension seemingly captures a preference for or against EU security institutions must be 
considered. Despite initial trepidation, MEP’s from new member states have seemingly warmed up to EU 
integration (Scully et al., 2012).  
What the analysis appears to be capturing is that old and new member states tend to have different priorities 
relating to asylum issues, which become evident when examining the speech dimension. Conflict may stem 
from the clash between Western European countries seeking to promote liberal principles and international 
humanitarian law, and Eastern European countries that do not have the same tradition for human rights’ 
protection (Subhan and Lavenex, 1999: 2). An alternative explanation, when taking into account the previously 
discussed lack of significance with the asylum index, is that old member states are more focused on debating 
the current refugee crisis than new member states, even if they do not agree about how the issue should be 
tackled. This could be evidence that topical differences rather than political preferences have been brought 
forth by Wordfish. On the other hand, the check for face validity indicates that asylum and irregular 
immigration are indeed the common topic among the speakers on both the ‘left’ and the ‘right’, due to the 
high word-fixed effects of words such as ‘immigration’, ‘asylum’, ‘refugee’, ‘illegal’, and ‘border’. This seems to 
indicate that actual preferences are being expressed in the Wordfish analysis, rather than old member states 
and new member states discussing separate topics entirely. 
5.2.3 Hypothesis 3 
H3. National parties’ general right-left policy preferences significantly shape their MEP’s political positioning 
relating to asylum and irregular immigration. 
Alongside length of EU membership, general right-left policy preferences of national parties were found to 
have a significant negative relationship with MEP preferences regarding asylum, when taking into account 
control variables (M6). Seemingly, national party right-left preferences may in fact override other more policy-
specific preferences, which could be attributed to the closeness of asylum policy to the core functioning of the 
state. The relation is the strongest of all the independent variables in this case, and the direction of the 
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coefficients match Proksch and Slapin (2010). Although Proksch and Slapin (2010: 608) do not find strong 
evidence for right-left ideology driving speeches, they posit that this aspect may matter more in specific policy 
areas. Based on the results here, this seems to be the case for the asylum policy area, as right-left preferences 
have the strongest level of significance. Thus, this hypothesis can be accepted.  
5.2.4 Hypothesis 4 
H4. National parties’ general pro-/anti-EU policy preferences significantly shape their MEP’s political 
positioning relating to asylum and irregular immigration.  
National party preferences pertaining to EU integration were not significant in any of the models, rejecting this 
hypothesis. This was a very surprising result, as previous studies of EP preferences found this variable to be a 
key factor shaping preferences expressed through speech (Proksch and Slapin, 2010) and voting patterns (Hix 
and Noury, 2007). There are some possible explanations for this unexpected divergence relating to differences 
in the time periods and policy areas examined. Both of the aforementioned studies cover the 5th EP (1999-
2004), where this study covers both the 6th and 7th EPs (2004-2014). In terms of speech pertaining to AFSJ, the 
policy area was in its infancy during the 5th EP (1999-2004), meaning that EU integration issues may have been 
at the forefront. Integration in this policy area has only increased since then, with most AFSJ topics shifting 
away from the intergovernmental level post-Lisbon treaty. In this regard, Hoffmann (1966: 883-884) compares 
the nation-state to an artichoke: while increasing EU integration may peel off sovereignty ‘leaf-by-leaf’, 
governments will likely become ever more vigilant as the ‘heart’ becomes exposed. Without a doubt, asylum 
touches upon key functions of the state such as the defence of its borders, citizenship, and distribution. 
Therefore, it is sensible that general right-left preferences, which aggregate diverse interests—rather than a 
narrower set of interests such as human rights and EU integration—weigh most heavily in this area.  
Temporal differences in what is being studied here also provides a key differentiating factor: EU enlargement 
occurring in 2004. MEPs from new member states only served for a few weeks in the 5th EP, excluding them 
from analysis in this time period (Proksch and Slapin, 2010: 598). Introducing 13 new member states may have 
been a game-changer for the dynamics of the EP, causing a realignment in the priorities and points of 
contention expressed through both speech and voting. A further explanation can be that neither of the 
aforementioned studies are focused specifically on asylum; Proksch and Slapin (2010) examine speeches from 
all policy areas, while Hix and Noury (2007) focus on voting behavior on a few key pieces of immigration 
legislation. Again, asylum policy seems to have a somewhat different dynamic than captured within generalized 
EP speeches and voting behavior in the EP regarding EU integration preferences.  
In addition, although the ‘right’ in this case appear to take on a pro-EU security rhetoric, the ‘left’ is not united 
in a staunch anti-EU integration position. While some Eurosceptic MEPs likely take a ‘left’ position due to their 
anti-EU stance, other ‘left’ MEPs make take this position due to preferring de-securitization of asylum policy. 
These MEPs can thus remain generally pro-EU, but specifically anti-EU security. This can explain why national 
parties’ pro-/anti-EU preferences fail to predict MEP positioning within this policy space. 
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5.2.5 Control variables 
Critics of using roll-call votes to measure policy preferences claim that such studies overstate the importance of 
EP party groups for influencing MEP positions. Conventional thinking is that party discipline largely constrains 
what legislators ‘do’ (in terms of voting), but less so in terms of what legislators ‘say’ (in terms of speeches) 
(Schwarz et al., 2015: 2). Speeches should thus reveal more of the latent preferences of MEPs. In this case, 
adding the party group control variable was indeed found to substantially improve the predictive power of the 
regression model, indicating that belonging to a party group does have some relation to the asylum 
preferences that MEP’s express via speech. Furthermore, the EPP was found to be highly significantly different 
than the reference party (ALDE) generally clustering to the ‘right’ within the asylum policy space. This follows 
Proksch and Slapin (2012), who found that selection effects influenced speeches from members of national 
parliament in Germany and the United Kingdom: in some cases, dissident party members received less time on 
the floor if their positions were far-removed from party leadership. Due to the fact that EP party groups—not 
national parties—control the allotment of plenary speaking time, it is possible that there is a similar tendency 
in the EP. Investigating EP speeches indicates that there is a similar party discipline in effect that occurs when 
MEP’s participate in roll-call voting. The significance of the party group control variable in this case seems to 
indicate that party group effects are indeed strong; the fact that party groups directly control who takes the 
floor may even make them more impactful than preferences of national parties. Future studies of the EP could 
compare whether national party or EP party group preferences have stronger links to how MEPs position 
themselves through speech, in general, or across different policy areas. 
On the other hand, accounting for country-level effects worsened the performance of the regression model. 
While country-level effects cannot themselves explain MEP preferences expressed through speech, accounting 
for them in the model reveals other underlying tendencies. This was somewhat unexpected, as the literature 
shows aggregate national tendencies for immigration preferences; for example, countries with a colonial past 
are likely to have more liberal immigration and asylum policies (Hix and Noury, 2007: 186). As a result, it could 
be assumed that adding country-effects as a control variable could account for some of the variation in the 
model. Despite the lack of significance of country-level controls, they had an impact on the significance of the 
independent variables. After both controls were taken into account, the general right-left preferences became 
significant. However, running the final regression model without country-level controls resulted in a higher 
adjusted R2 value and very significant coefficients (p < .01) for both general right-left preferences and length of 
EU membership variables. 
5.2.6 Use of manifesto data for national party positions 
While manifestos are widely used, they are also criticized by some researchers. Critics claim that the data 
generation process is not appropriately modeled via standard data reduction techniques, which can potentially 
lead to overconfident or nonsensical results (Bakker, 2009: 414). Furthermore, datasets of political positioning 
created through manifesto coding are highly volatile (Bakker, 2009). This volatility was seen as a strength in this 
case, due to the newness of the AFSJ policy area in the EU, and EU enlargement as a ‘game changer’. However, 
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the measurement inaccuracy of manifesto data could explain some of the unexpected results, i.e. lack of 
influence of pro-/anti-EU integration preferences, and reversed directed of the coefficient of the general right-
left preferences. Future studies could alleviate some of this concern by supporting EMP data with other data, 
e.g. expert surveys, to minimize their inherent weaknesses, and combine their respective strengths. For 
example, Bakker (2009) show success combining these two datasets. The difficulty is in combining the varying 
time series and holes within different datasets, which is particularly onerous when covering an entire decade’s 
worth of speeches, as in this study. 
5.3 Preliminary conclusion 
Despite the previously mentioned limitations of this study, the process of conducting Wordfish analysis was 
magnitudes more efficient than hand-coding, while maintaining a highly significant correlation between the 
two approaches. Furthermore, examining speeches rather than roll-call voting behavior or expert surveys shed 
new light, while confirming observations gained in previous research on the EP in this policy area. However, the 
Wordfish approach, and the underlying speech data, also presented some challenges. The need for a plentiful 
sample of lengthy speeches limits the number of MEPs and national parties that can be represented in the 
analysis, excluding the voice of smaller parties. In addition, a great number of speeches during the 7th 
parliamentary period (2009-2014) were not available in English, introducing potential for bias. Despite these 
limitations, Wordfish is robust to dropping out documents and individual speeches, and the sample size was 
comparable to previous studies of the EP.  
In terms of the regression analysis, the second and third hypotheses, concerning the relation between MEP 
positioning in the asylum policy space, and their national parties’ length of EU membership and general right-
left preferences, were confirmed. National parties from new member states lack the same tradition for human 
rights as the old liberal EU member states, granting a preference for increased EU security measures. 
Additionally, the closeness of asylum and irregular migration policy to the heart of the state explains the 
relation between national parties’ general right-left and their MEPs positioning in this policy space. The 
significance and impact of the control variable for EP party groups corroborates the findings of studies based 
on EP voting behavior, raising doubts concerning the common assumption that MEPs are less constrained by 
party group factors when conducting plenary speeches. The following Chapter synthesizes these considerations 
and findings to answer the research question, while considering wider ramifications. 
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6. Conclusion 
This Chapter brings together the most pertinent findings of this study to draw conclusions. Section 6.1 returns 
to the bigger picture of the study, reintroducing and answering the problem definition, based on the findings of 
the results and discussion Chapters. Section 6.2 considers the impact of these answers on the dynamics of the 
EP, focused on the dissolution of its staunch tradition for upholding human rights. Section 6.3 provides final 
reflections on the implications of the study, showcasing the potential of using automated content-analysis for 
analyzing EU politics. 
6.1 Answering the research question 
The high stakes of the current refugee crisis require effective yet humane solutions, and the cross-border 
nature of the problem warrants EU-level interventions. As the only directly elected institution, the EP plays a 
vital role in this policy area, protecting the interests of citizens, and upholding fundamental rights within the 
legislative process. Changes in the EP’s institutional capabilities (through the adoption of OLP in asylum policy) 
and constellation (in terms of enlargement), among others, warranted investigation of the policy preferences 
of its members. Automated content analysis of MEP speeches using Wordfish, covering the initial decade of 
‘first pillar’ asylum policy, provided both expected and surprising answers to the problem definition:  
To what extent do different national party preferences align with MEPs’ political positioning within the 
policy space of asylum and irregular immigration? 
Wordfish analysis characterized the asylum and irregular policy space as encompassing a pro-/anti-EU security 
dimension. Two aspects of national party preferences were found to have a significant relation to MEPs’ 
positioning within this political space, as expressed through their plenary speeches: general right-left 
preferences and duration of EU membership. This finding confirms the dominant thinking within the literature 
on the EP, which characterizes MEP’s as agents serving two principals, i.e. their parties back home, and EU 
party groups. This can be explained by the fact that national parties wield the power to determine who is able 
to have a career in the EP through the candidate selection process. When accounting for country-level and 
party group effects, national parties’ general right-left preferences were found to be the most significant 
predictor of MEP positioning. Although this finding did not conform with other studies of EP plenary speeches 
(Proksch and Slapin, 2010), a likely explanation is the closeness of asylum and irregular immigration policy to 
the core functions of the state. As such, these national party preferences founded in wider social and economic 
interests were more strongly linked to asylum positioning, compared to policy specific issues such as views on 
human rights and immigration. Diverting from other studies of the EP, national party stances for or against EU 
integration were not found not have any link to how their respective MEPs’ were placed within the investigated 
policy space. Seemingly, the anti-EU security ‘left’ in this policy area was comprised of both Eurosceptic and 
more EU positive, but de-securitization focused, MEPs. 
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MEPs representing parties from the predominantly Central and Eastern European post-2004 enlargement 
member states were significantly more security-minded in their speeches compared to MEPs from the EU-15, 
generally placing to the ‘right’ within this policy space. New member state MEPs were much more likely to 
speak of EU immigration security institutions, such as EURODAC and RABIT. On the other hand, old member 
states were more likely to speak of conflict and humanitarian issues in the Middle East and Africa. Although the 
new member states are often characterized as being more right-winged, it was surprising to find that they are 
positive over EU security, as it could be assumed that they would be hesitant to give up sovereignty regarding 
such sensitive state functions. However, studies concerning the influence of 2004 enlargement on the EP show 
that new MEPs have quickly warmed up to EU integration (Scully et al., 2012). With Central and Eastern 
European countries having less of a tradition for human rights compared to more liberal EU-15 member states 
(Subhan and Lavenex, 1999), the tendency to prefer security measures is logical. This highlights the presence of 
an underlying ideological divide between new and old member states within this policy area. 
Although it would seem likely that general national-level factors, such as the number of asylum seekers, GDP, 
and size of the pension burden, may have an impact on the preferences of MEPs in this policy area, there was 
no evidence to back up this assumption. Rather, the analysis shows the dominance of party ideology over 
nationality; while there was a significant difference between parties from old and new member states, general 
country-level effects had no significant relation to the preferences of the MEPs. On the other hand, taking into 
consideration the influence of EP party groups substantially improved the predictive strength of the regression 
model. This follows the literature examining EP roll-call voting behavior, which posits that EP party group 
discipline leads to cohesive voting behavior. Although it would be plausible for party discipline to influence 
what MEP’s ‘do’ but not ‘say’ (Schwarz et al., 2015), a possible explanation for how EP party groups maintain 
spoken policy cohesion is that they control the allotment of plenary speaking time (Proksch and Slapin, 2012). 
By keeping dissident party members on the backbench, it is possible to limit their ability to speak out against 
the party line. One key difference pertains the MEPs from the Eurosceptic EFD group, who placed slightly 
center-'left' within the asylum policy space. While EFD MEPs on average did not speak favorably of EU security 
in their speeches, studies on their voting behavior indicate that they consistently vote in favor of less 
immigrant-friendly legislation (Lopatin, 2013), when push comes to shove.  
6.2 Change in the dynamics of the European Parliament 
Due to the increase in the legislative power of the EP, and urgent need for efficient policy responses to issues 
within the AFSJ, there has been a growing pressure for the EP to become a more responsible and legitimate 
counterpart vis-à-vis the Council. As a response, the larger groups (i.e. EPP and S&D) are more willing to move 
into the security-minded mainstream (Servent, 2010). This notion was confirmed in this study’s use of Wordfish 
analysis, with the center-right EPP taking a significant pro-security stance within the asylum policy space, and 
with the center-left S&D divided across the policy space, distant from the more cohesive smaller liberal, green, 
and socialist party groups. With the S&D having a mean near-‘center’ position in the asylum policy space, this 
unlikely alliance among giants could be driven by the growing presence of Eurosceptic parties within the EP, 
46 
 
leading the center-most parties to reach compromises in order to maintain the required legislative efficiency 
now that the EP is equal partner within the OLP. Evidently, the divisions for and against increased EU security 
measures are not limited to how MEP’s vote on asylum legislation—they carry into the speech dimension as 
well. While the EP has matured into a most powerful adversary for the Council within matters of the AFSJ, this 
study confirms the notion that the need for pragmatism among the larger parties brings with it growing pains 
in the form of lessened human rights ambitions, with a preference for EU security measures as expressed 
through speech. Combined with the generally pro-EU security preferences of new member states, this clearly 
indicates that the EP should not be taken for granted as an institution that has a singular stake in the ‘human 
rights’ vs. ‘security’ dichotomy. This tendency is not only reflected through the institutional constraints of 
highly disciplined roll-call voting, but seeps into the stances that MEPs take when speaking (relatively) freely in 
parliamentary debates.  
6.3 Further implications 
These findings have implications for EU studies, and the wider field of computer-based text analysis. Building 
upon the groundbreaking work of Proksch and Slapin (2010), this study confirms the relevance of analyzing 
plenary speeches using computer-based content analysis methods. In this case, Wordfish was an efficient and 
valid tool for examining plenary speeches, although using the EP Archives as a data source presented some 
difficulties. Plenary speech analysis revealed similar tendencies to previous studies, including assessments of 
general voting behavior, and deeper case studies of individual pieces of legislation, showing the strength of the 
Wordfish approach. The unique findings relating to this politically charged and sensitive policy area motivate 
similar studies of other avenues of EU politics. Furthermore, the success of the Wordfish approach opens the 
opportunity to include other actors in future investigations, gaining further perspective on position-taking 
within legislative negotiations. Computer-based methods could be used to analyze policy preferences using a 
range of easily available digital text data, from social media to election manifestos. Such an approach need not 
be limited to the EP, but could apply to other EU institutions, interest groups and even the voters themselves. 
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8. Appendix 
8.1 Wordfish code 
The following Wordfish script was utilized: 
[output location] <- wordfish([dataset], # Here we input the relevant document-term matrix 
              wordsincol = T, # Here we indicate that the word counts are arranged in columns 
dir = c([left], [right]), # Here we provide the column number of the documents which identify the 
direction of the political scale, where the first value represents a negative position and the second a 
positive position 
              output = "[output]", # Here we indicate the output file name 
              writeout = T # This tells Wordfish to create an output file 
 boot = T, # This gives a parametric bootstrap 
 nsim = 200, # Sets bootstrap to run 200 simulations 
) 
8.2 Appendix figures and tables 
 
APPENDIX FIGURE 1. LINEARITY TEST FOR ASYLUM INDEX 
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APPENDIX FIGURE 2. LINEARITY TEST FOR GENERAL RIGHT-LEFT PREFERENCES VARIABLE 
 
APPENDIX FIGURE 3. LINEARITY TEST FOR PRO-/ANTI-EU INTEGRATION 
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APPENDIX FIGURE 4. LINEARITY TEST FOR LENGTH OF EU MEMBERSHIP 
 
 
APPENDIX FIGURE 5. TEST FOR HOMOSCEDASTICITY 
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APPENDIX FIGURE 6. TEST FOR NORMALITY: HISTOGRAM OF REGRESSION RESIDUALS 
 
APPENDIX FIGURE 7. TEST FOR NORMALITY: P-P PLOT OF REGRESSION RESIDUALS 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1. OVERVIEW OF PARTIES USED IN WORDFISH ANALYSIS 
National party Abbreviation Country EP Party EMP code 
Alliance ‘90/Greens B90/GR DE G/EFA 41113 
Austrian People’s Party ÖVP AT PPE 42520 
British National Party BNP UK NI 51701 
Christian Democratic Union CDU DE PPE 41521 
Christian Social Union CSU DE PPE 41522 
Christian Union + Reformed Political Party CU/SGP NL EFD 22225 
Civic Platform PO PL PPE 92435 
Conservative Party CON UK EFD 51620 
Democratic Liberal Party PD-L RO PPE 93323 
Democratic Movement for Europe MoDEM FR ALDE 31950 
Democratic Party DIKO CY SD 36420 
Democratic Party PD IT SD 32331 
Democratic Rally DISY CY PPE 36510 
Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania UDMR RO PPE 93951 
Democrats 66 D66 NL ALDE 22330 
Election Coalition Committee of the Democratic Left 
Alliance - Labour Union 
SLD-UP PL SD 92210 
Europe Ecology EE FR G/EFA 31112 
Fidez - Hungarian Civic Union FIDESZ HU PPE 86524 
Flemish Block VB BE EFD 21914 
Flemish Liberals and Democrats OPEN VLD BE ALDE 21421 
Free Democratic Party – The Liberals FDP DE ALDE 41420 
Freedom Party of Austria FPÖ AT NI 42420 
Green Left GL NL G/EFA 22110 
Green Party Greens UK G/EFA 51110 
Hungarian Socialist Party MSZP HU SD 86220 
Italy of Values – List of Petrio IdV IT ALDE 32422 
Labour Party Lab UK SD 51320 
Labour Party PL MA SD 37320 
Labour Party PvdA NL SD 22320 
Law and Justice PiS PL EFD 92436 
Left Bloc BE PT GUE/NGL 35223 
Left Front FG FR GUE/NGL 31223 
Liberal Democratic Party LDP UK ALDE 51421 
Liberal People's Party FP SE ALDE 11420 
List Anticapitalist – Another Europe Altra IT SD 32221 
National Front FN FR NI 31710 
Nationalist Party PN MA PPE 37520 
New Democracy ND EL PPE 34511 
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North League LN IT EFD 32720 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement PASOK EL SD 34313 
Party Direction - Social Democracy Smer SK SD 96423 
Party for Freedom PVV NL NI 22721 
People’s Party PP ES PPE 33610 
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy VVD NL ALDE 22420 
Progressive Party of Working People AKEL CY GUE/NGL 36220 
Reformist Movement MR BE ALDE 21427 
Self Defence of the Republic of Poland SO PL NI 92622 
Slovak National Party SNS SK EFD 96710 
Social Democratic Party PSD PT PPE 35313 
Social Democratic Party SPD DE SD 41320 
Social Democratic Party of Austria SPÖ AT SD 42320 
Social Democrats SD SL SD 97321 
Socialist Party PS FR SD 31320 
Socialist Party PS PT SD 35311 
Socialist Party SP NL GUE/NGL 22210 
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party PSOE ES SD 33320 
Swedish Social Democratic Party S SE GUE/NGL 11320 
The Left Die Linke DE GUE/NGL 41221 
The People of Freedom PDL IT PPE 32630 
Union for a Popular Movement UMP FR PPE 31645 
United Kingdom Independence Party UKIP UK EFD 51951 
United Left IU-ICV ES G/EFA 33220 
 
